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NOTES
POWER OF REORGANIZATION COURT TO ENJOIN PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE
FROM COMMUNICATING WITH SECURITY HoLDERs *
SECTION 77B of the Bankruptcy Act attempted to abate the abuses incident
to the virtually uncontrolled operation of protective committees in equity
receivership reorganizations' by subjecting committees to judicial supervision
rather than by minimizing their office in the reorganization scheme.2 One of
the functions still reserved almost exclusively to committees is that of re-
porting to security holders on the status of the reorganization and on the
virtues and deficiencies of particular proposals.3 The context and tenor of
committee solicitations and circulars may exert a determining influence upon
the makeup of the reorganization plan 4 and may even prevent the consum-
mation of any plan5 and thereby profoundly affect the interests of the various
claimants. Some sort of supervision over committee communications is there-
fore necessary if recalcitrant committees0 or those seeking to serve interests
adverse to those of the investors7 are to be prevented from thwarting or
dominating a reorganization. Accordingly, even though specific statutory
* In re Schroeder Hotel Co., 86 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; In re Madison
Hotel Corp., S. D. N. Y., March 6, 1937, aff'd without opinion, C. C. A. 2d, May 17,
1937.
1. See generally, S. E. C., REPORT ori PRorEcr1Vs AND REOnGANIZATION Co!usrr-
TEEs (1936-37) Parts I, III; Douglas, Protective Connittces in Railroad Reorganications
(1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 565, 567; Comment (1935) 35 Co. L Rzv. 905. Curbing these
excesses was one of the major objectives of § 77B. See Weiner, Corporate Reorgani-
zations: Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1173, 1183.
2. See §§77B(b) (10), 77B(c) (4) (a) & (b), 77B(c) (9), 77B(e) (1), 77B(f) (5),
48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. § 207 (f) (5) (1934) ; Rohrlich, The New Deal in Corpora-
tion Law (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1167, 1185; Weiner, supra note 1, at 1183 ct seq. It
is doubtful whether these regulations have achieved the desired results. Fortas, The
Securities Act and Corporate Reorganizations (1937) 4 LAw & CoN=mIP. Pror. 218,
228 et seq.
3. See Lowenthal, The Stock Exchange and Protective Committee Securities
(1933) 33 CoL L. REv. 1293, 1320; Comment (1935) 35 Co. L Rtv. 905, 911.
4. See p. 1392 infra; S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 1, Part III, at 96. On solicitation
practices of committees, see S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 1, Part I, at 83 et seq.
5. See p. 1392 infra. Deposit agreements between committees and security holders
usually empower committees to cast votes on a plan unless a dissent is filed within a
specified period. See In re Witherbee Court Corp., 88 F. (2d) 251 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ;
S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 1, Part I, at 889. Depositors usually acquiesce passively to
committee advice [Rohrlich, supra note 2, at 1181] but where there are rival commit-
tees depositors may occasionally be moved to independent action. See, e.g., Brief for
Appellees, p. 5, In re Madison Hotel Corp., S. D. N. Y., March 6, 1937, off'd without
opinion, C. C. A. 2d, May 17, 1937.
6. "Strikers" have often attempted to capitalize nuisance values in reorganization
proceedings. See Comment (1934) 34 CoL L. Rzv. 1303, 1317 et seq.
7. See S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 1, Part III, at 86.
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authority is lacking, some courts have adopted the practice of prescribing or
inspecting the contents of committee literature."
Two recent cases put in issue another device which is apparently being
utilized with increasing frequency for the purpose of controlling committee
communications. In one, the district court had directed the removal of a
protective committee for communicating false information to bondholders
in an effort to prevent the consummation of any plan of reorganization.,
When these obstructionist tactics were nevertheless continued, the court,
upon the debtor's petition, enjoined the erstwhile committee members and
their agents from communicating to any security holder, in writing or other-
wise, ".... any purported information or advice with regard to the pro-
ceedings or actions of this court." On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit sustained the order as a permissible exercise of
the lower court's power to effectuate the bankruptcy jurisdiction granted
it by Congress, rejecting the argument that the injunction violated the de-
fendant's constitutional right of free speech on the ground that they had
previously abused their right.10
In a second case, a plan desired by the debtor, and supported by a committee
with which 86% of the bonds had been deposited, was not approved by the
necessary two-thirds of the bondholders because a minority group of bond-
holders, believing that the proposal showed undue solicitude for an insolvent
debtor with no equity in the property, 1 had induced a sufficient number of
bondholders to file dissents.1 2 Since some investors had apparently switched
their votes as many as three times because of the bitter circularization cam-
paign waged by the opposing interests, the court issued an order restraining
all parties from further written communication with the security holders.
Subsequently a new plan was advanced and approved by the court. Requi-
8. See In re Butterick Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 2414.06 (S.D. N.Y. 1935);
In re Saenger Theatres Inc., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 2328.02 (E. D. La. 1935). Com-
munications from Federal District Judges Knight and Coleman to the YALE LAW JoUR-
NAL state that this practice is regularly followed in their courts, and a communication
.to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Clinton S. Ruch, of New York, states that it was em-
ployed by Judge Inch in a recent reorganization proceeding. See note 23, infra.
9. The removal was effected in a unique fashion. By resort to its authority to
scrutinize and disregard provisions of the deposit agreement [§77B(b) (10), 48 STAT.
912, 11 U. S. C. § 207(b) (10) (1934); see Fortas, supra note 2, at 230], the court re-
strained the committee from exercising the power to represent depositors. See also,
Texas Hotel Securities Corp. v. Waco Development Co., 87 F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 5th,
1936) (Individual purchasing claims to block plan held entitled to vote).
10. In re Schroeder Hotel Co., 86 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), (1937) 50
HARv. L. REV. 831.
11. The chief objectionable provision was that awarding one-third of the stock of
the new corporation to another corporation owned by the debtor interests in satisfac-
tion of a disputed claim against the debtor's furniture. See Brief for Appellees, p. 3,
In re Madison Hotel Corp., S. D. N. Y., March 6, 1937, aff'd without opinion, C. C. A.
2d, May 17, 1937.
12. It is unnecessary to obtain acceptances from classes having no equity in the
property. §77B (e) (1), 48 STAT. 918, 11 U. S. C. §207 (e) (1) (1934). .See In re
Reading Hotel Co., 10 F. Supp. 470 (E. D. Pa. 1935) (stockholders); In re William
Penn Garage, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 112419.02 (W. D. Pa. 1935) (junior creditors).
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site bondholder consent could apparently have been obtained to this proposal
since it eliminated the objectionable features of the old plan. But the debtor
petitioned for an order enjoining all other parties from communicating any
new plan to the bondholders until it had enjoyed a "reasonable opportunity" to
obtain acceptances to a slightly modified version of the old plan. Instead, the
court entered an order continuing the injunction in force as to the petitioner
but lifting it to allow the proponents of the new plan to circularize the bond-
holders. The debtor appealed on the ground that its right of free speech had
been violated, but the order was affirmed without opinion by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.'
This use of the injunction' 4 raises once again the question of the propriety
of a previous restraint on freedom of speech. The constitutional prohibition
against any such restraint 1 embraces the individual's right freely to speak
his mind not only on questions of public importance, but also upon matters
of purely private interest, the proscription in the latter case being expresed
by the courts in terms of the traditional concept that equity will not enjoin a
libel.' 6 While the strict enforcement of this principle would manifestly outlaw
orders of the type under discussion, some support therefor could be derived
13. In re 'Madison Hotel Corp., S. D. N. Y., March 6, 1937, aff'd without opinion,
C. C. A. 2d, May 17, 1937.
14. For similar uses of the injunctive power, see In re Granville & Winthrop Bldg.
Corp., 87 F. (2d) 101, 102 (C. C.A. 7th, 1936); Straus v. Baker Co., 87 F. (2d) 401,
405 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). Statutory sanction for these injunctions may fe found in
§ 2 (15) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 546 (1298), 11 U. S. C. § 11 (15) (1934),
which authorizes Bankruptcy courts to "make such orders, issue such process, and
enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may he necessary
for the enforcement . . ." of the Act. For the broad scope of this provision in reor-
ganizations, see Continental I11. Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry.,
294 U. S. 648, 676 (1934), (1935) 48 HAM L. Rev. 1430. See also (1935) 44 YAuE
L. J. 677.
15. Near -. innesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1930); Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U. S. 233 (1935). Although the First Amendment says that "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech," there is no doubt that the federal
courts are bound by the prohibition. See dissenting opinion, Harlan, J., in Patterson V.
Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 464 (1906) ; Concurring opinion, Van Orsdel, J., in American
Federation of Labor v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 33 App. D. C. 83, 112 (1903);
Trinitv Iethodist Church South v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 F. (2d) 850, 851 (App.
D. C., 1932). Cf. State cx rex. Liversey v. Judge Civil Dist. Ct.. 34 La. Aun. 741, 793,
799 (1882); Crouch v. Central Labor Council, 134 Ore. 612, 622, 293 Pac. 729, 732
(1930). The distinction between previous restraint and subsequent punishment, which
is permissible where the privilege has been abused, is often tenuous. See Comment
(1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 1148, 1155. And in any event the severity of the prescribed pun-
ishment rather than the abstract category into which it is placed, determines the
effectiveness of a restriction on freedom. See Comment (1931) 41 Y.nL L. J. 262, 269.
16. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 2?3 (N.Y. 1835) ; State ex. rel. Liversey v. judge
Civil Dist. Ct., 34 La. Ann. 741 (1882) ; Life Ass'n of America v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App.
173 (1876) ; Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384. 64 N.E. 163 (1902). See
Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Pcrsonalt, (1916) 29 Hnv.
L. Rn'. 640, 648 ct seq.; Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity (1937) 50 HAn .
L. REv. 171, 219.
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from the exception to the rule, frequently applied in labor"1 and patent in-
fringement1 8 disputes, which permits -the issuance of an injunction against
the spoken or written word where irreparable injury to property would other-
wise ensue. 19 Thus it is arguable that a bankruptcy court may properly enjoin
communications whose effect would be to impair or destroy the equity of the
debtor or the property interests of any group of creditors-results which
the successful execution of the appellants' design would probably have occa-
sioned in the instant cases.20 Although this doctrine2' would rest on cases
where specific types of statements have been proscribed, 22 the scope of an
injunction theoretically does not affect its character as a previous restraint,
so that the blanket injunctions issued in the principal cases seem equally as
valid as orders requiring the submission of all communications to the court
before dispatch, 23 or restraining the circulation of false and misleading in-
17. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1910); Hitchman Coal
& Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917); Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine
Operators Union of Minneapolis, Local 219, 151 Minn. 220, 186 N.W. 781 (1922);
Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture Machine Operators Local No. 170, 282 Mo.
304, 221 S. W. 95 (1920) ; Kraemer Hosiery Co. v. American Federation of Full Fash-
ioned Hosiery Workers, 305 Pa. 206, 157 Atl. 588 (1931). Contra: Marx & Haas
Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133, 67 S. W. 391 (1902) (apparently over-
ruled by the Hughes case supra) ; Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 37
Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127 (1908). See Notes (1911) 32 L. R. A. (x.s.) 1013, (1920)
6 A.L.R. 909, 971 et seq., (1922) 16 A.L.R. 230, (1923) 27 A.L.R. 651, 658; Simp-
son, supra note 16, at 193 et seq.
18. Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. 46 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1888); Maytag v. Meadows Mfg.
Co., 35 F. (2d) 403 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929). See (1934) 23 GEO. L. J. 81; (1936) 34 Micu.
L. REv. 570. For other situations in which property rights were similarly protected by
the injunctive process, see American Mercury, Inc. v. Chase, 13 F. (2d) 224 (D. Mass.
1926); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. NVahlgren, 1 F. Supp. 799 (N. D. I11. 1932);
Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun American Publishing, 245 Mass. 262, 139 N. E. 655 (1923);
National Life Ins. Co. of U. S. v. Myers, 140 I11. App. 392 (1908).
19. The theory generally employed is that the forbidden utterances or publications
are but part of an illegal conspiracy to damage property and as such are enjoinable.
See Notes (1911) 32 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1013, (1920) 6 A. L. R. 909, 911 et seq. In this
connection it has been stated that "some courts have taken a rather doctrinaire atti-
tude toward labor controversies, holding illegal peaceable and honest conduct directed
toward ends considered by labor to be legitimate and necessary to its own economic
protection." Simpson, supra note 16, at 197. Cf. Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930)
39 YALE L. J. 682, 684 et seq.
In the Schroeder case the court seemed to rest its decision on its power to protect
its bankruptcy jurisdiction, although it relied on cases based on the protection of prop-
erty rights. For a discussion of the validity of this theory, see pp. 1395-96 infra.
20. See In re Schroeder Hotel Co., 86 F. (2d) 491, 492 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936);
In re Madison Hotel Corp., S. D. N. Y., March 6, 1937, aff'd without opinion, C. C. A,
2d, May 17, 1937.
21. Where the communication privilege had previously been abused with conse-
quent injury to the estate, a subsequent injunction would be even more clearly support-
able. See cases cited notes 17, 18 supra.
22. See (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 923.
23. See note 8, supra. Although the propriety of the procedure has apparently
not yet been questioned, the circuit court in the Schroeder case indicated that the lower
[Vol. 461394
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formation. 24 In any event, other precedents for allowing the 77B courts
to exercise so broad an injunctive power are available. The power of the
Postmaster-General to withdraw mailing privileges from publications he
deems seditious 25 and the similar power of the Federal Communications Com-
mission to refuse to grant or renew or to revoke broadcasting licenses as re-
quired by "the public convenience, interest or necessity"20 represent for all
practical purposes previous restraints on publications or utterances conveyed
through these vital media of communication. -7 Since these instances indi-
cate that grounds will be found for sustaining those previous restraints con-
sidered essential to the attainment of an end of sufficient importance,23 control
court could have adopted it instead of issuing a blanket injunction, at the -came time
recognizing the administrative difficult, this procedure entails. 96 F. (2d) 491, 493.
This practice is substantially similar to that which the S. E. C. is authorized to pursue
with regard to security prospectuses. See Securities Act § 5, 48 STAT. 77 (1933), as
amended by § 204, 48 STAT. 906, 15 U. S. C. § 77e (1934); § 8, 48 STAT. 79 (1933), 15
U. S. C. § 77h (1934); §10, 48 STAT. 81 (1933), as amended by § 205, 43 STAT. 906, 15
U. S. C. §77j (1934); 3 C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds Serv. ff3105-3111. The act vas
held a valid exercise of Congress' power over the mails in Jones v. S. E. C., 79 F.
(2d) 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 298 U. S. 1 (1936). See Com-
ment (1935) 5 FoRD. L. REV. 302, 312.
24. To justify the breadth of the injunction the court in the Schrocdcr case relied
principally on Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690, (1931) 31 Cot. L RE%.
717, which sustained an injunction against all further picketing where the defendants
had violated a previous order restraining only unlawful picketing. Prior illegal acts
have often served as the basis for an injunction against all picketing, legal or illegal.
See Comment (1931) 44 HAv. L. REv. 971. The fact that a publication may be
libelous is in theory immaterial insofar as its liability to previous restraint is con-
cerned. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462 (1905); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U. S. 697, 721 (1930).
25. 40 STAT. 230 (1917), 18 U. S. C. §§ 343-345 (1934); Milwaukee Publishing
Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407 (1921); Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed.
535 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F. (2d) 227 (S. D. N. Y. 1930) (no
constitutional guaranty of right of use of mails). Congress has excluded a great
variety of matter from the mails. See Comment (1930) 10 B. U. L Ray. 246.
26. 48 STAT. 1085, 1086, 47 U. S. C. §§309a, 312(a) (1934).
This provision has been upheld as against the free speech argument. Trinity
Methodist Church South v. Federal Radio Comm. 62 F. (2d) 850 (App. D. C., 1932),
cert. denied, 284 U. S. 685; cf. KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n Incorp. %,. Federal Radio
Commission, 47 F. (2d) 670 (App. D. C., 1931). It has also been sustained against
the due process objection. Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & M,1'tge Co.,
289 U. S. 266 (1933). On censorship under the Tariff Act, see Comment (1931)
31 CoL. L. REv. 1148, 1153. Motion picture censorship has been upheld. Mutual Film
Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm., 236 U. S. 230 (1915). See Comments (1931) 31
Co. L. REv. 1148, 1154; Legis. (1930) 44 HtAv. L REv. 113.
27. See dissenting opinions by Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., in Milwaukee Social
Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 431, 437 (1921); Cohn, Censor-
ship of Radical Materials by the Post-Office (1932) 17 ST. Louis L. Rav. 95, 107
et seq.; Siegal, Censorship in Radio (1936) 7 Am L REV. 1, 19 ct seq.; Comments
(1933) 46 HARv. L. Rv. 987, 990; (1931) 31 Cot. L. REv. 1148, 1152 cf seq.; (1936)
7 Am L. Rv. 313.
28. See Comments (1933) 46 HAv. L. REv. 987, 992; (1930) 40 Yuta L. J. 967.
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of committee communications to effectuate the bankruptcy power would seem
constitutionally permissible. 29 A stronger argument can be presented for the
latter restriction, moreover, since it involves an impairment of the right to
speak freely on matters of private interest, and not of the more significant
political aspect of the constitutional guarantee,30 which is abridged by the
postal and radio powers.
Since the blanket injunction against committee communications does not
abridge political freedom, a decision as to the propriety of this newly-developed
device should be governed not by abstract conceptions of free speech, but
rather by a realization of the practical need for the injunction as a discre-
tionary measure which the reorganization court may invoke to conserve the
property under its jurisdiction. Courts have apparently resorted to this ex-
pedient not only to curb the excesses and deliberate misstatements of obviously
predatory committees and to expedite the consummation of reorganization
plans, but also to prevent apparently legitimate committees from flooding
investors and creditors with conflicting and confusing information and opin-
ions.31 The imperfections latent in a system dependent for its success in
large part on informed and intelligent investor judgment 32 may often make it
advisable to confine the arena of combat to the reorganization court, an agency
better equipped than unenlightened or biased creditors to evaluate opposing
contentions as to the worth of a plan. Once a court, after fair hearing, has
reached a decision on the merits of a plan, it can assist materially in obtaining
creditor approval or disapproval by careful use of the injunction against com-
munication. The same result could be achieved in more straightforward
fashion by making creditor and investor consent to a plan unnecessary, 33 but
29. Invocation of the injunction in this situation should be distinguished from its
use to ban the publication of court proceedings in order to expedite the jurisdiction
of the court. Its employment for the latter purpose has generally been held invalid.
Dailey v. Superior Court of City & County of San Francisco, 112 Cal. 94, 44 Pac.
458 (1896); In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 Pac. 227 (1893); Ex parte Foster,
44 Tex. Cr. R. 423, 71 S. W. 593 (1903); Ex parte McCormick, 129 Tex. Cr. R.
457, 88 S. W. (2d) 104 (1935); cf. In re Times Publishing Co., 276 Mich. 349,
267 N. W. 858 (1936). But cf. Tate v. State, 132 Tenn. 131, 177 S. W. 69 (1915).
See also (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1259.
30. For an intimation that a distinction can be drawn between utterances on
matters of public and of private interest, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 716.
See also Howell v. Bee Publishing Co., 100 Neb. 39, 42, 158 N. W. 358, 359 (1916).
It seems probable, moreover, that the protection against previous restraint was intended
to apply only to political utterances. Pound, su pra note 16, at 650; Comment (1931)
31 COL. L. REv. 1148, 1155.
31. See Record, fols. 665, 666, In re Madison Hotel Corp., S. D. N. Y., March
6, 1937, aff'd without opinion, C. C. A. 2d, May 17, 1937.
32. Cf. Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1177, 1198.
33. If certain conditions are met, a plan may be consummated without the con-
sent of two-thirds of a class of creditors or of a majority of stockholders. §§ 77B
(b)(4 and 5), 77B(e)(1), 48 STAr. 913, 914, 918. 11 U.S.C. §§207(b)(4 and 5),
207(e) (1) (1934). See Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 119. The constitutionality
of §77B(b)(5) has been questioned. See Tennessee Publishing Co. v.'American
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the emotional and constitutional objections to such a proposal34 are perhaps
obstacles too formidable to overcome. While indiscriminate resort to the
injunctive power by the 77B courts might operate to stifle constructive oppo-
sition, the salutary results which would doubtless flow from its judicious
exercise to curb self-seeking and delay-provoking committees far outweigh
any abuses possibly occasioned by its employment.
THE VENDEE'S LIEN ON PERSONALTY*
THE MISSOURI Pacific Railroad entered into contracts to purchase from
the defendant, a non-resident corporation, stocks and bonds of certain Mis-
souri corporations. The securities described in the contracts were deposited
in escrow with a New York trust company, and the railroad company paid
$3,200,000 upon the agreed purchase price. Plaintiff, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy of the Missouri Pacific Railroad, brought suit in Missouri to have
the contracts rescinded, on the grounds, inter alia, that they were ultra tires
and were induced by fraud and coercion, and also prayed that an equitable
lien be impressed upon the stock and bonds for the amount paid on the
purchase price. Jurisdiction in rent was sought to be obtained through
service upon the non-resident defendants by publication under the Missouri
statute providing for such service in suits for the enforcement of liens against
personal property within the jurisdiction of the court.1 Upon removal of
National Bank, 57 Sup. Ct. 85 (1936) (lower court decision holding section unconstitu-
tional declared premature).
Under the proposed Chandler Bill [75th Cong., 1st Sess., H. R. 6439] the plan
would originally be formulated by an independent trustee in bankruptcy, and thereupon
submitted to the court. After a hearing, the court, provided it deemed the plan "worthy
of consideration", would then be required, where the corporation's indebtedness exc-
ceeded $5,000,000, to submit it to the S.E.C.; and in other cases might do so at its
option. Should the court, upon receiving the Commission's report, find the plan fair,
it would be sent, together with the court's opinion, if any, and the S.F.C. report to
investors for their approval. Prior to this time all parties would ba forbidden to
solicit acceptances to a plan or authorities to accept. Chandler Bill, § 12-11(d) (5-8).
34. See Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 116, 119 ct seq. See also Wright v.
Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 57 Sup. Ct. 556 (1937); §74(e)
Bankruptcy Act, 48 STAT. 922, 11 U.S.C. §202(e) 1934.
* Thompson v. Terminal Shares, No. 10,731 (C. C. A. 8th, April 13, 1937).
1. Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 739 et seq. The statute also provided for
such service in attachment suits. Plaintiff sought to obtain jurisdiction by attaching
and garnishing the securities forming the subject matter of the contract, under the
well recognized rule that the securities of Missouri corporations have a situs for the
purpose of attachment in the state, although physically outside. (See Wood, Rcaching
Shares of Stock (1932) 38 AV. VA. L. Q. 219, 220 et seq.]. The District Court, how-
ever, held that writs of attachment could not issue under state law, since the petition
was for equitable relief. Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 14 F. Supp. 459, 469 (IV. D.
Mo. 1936).
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the cause to the federal court, the nonresident defendant's motion, entered at
a special appearance, to quash process and dismiss the bill was granted
on the ground that the bill failed to establish a cause of action for an equit-
able lien, and that, therefore, neither the state nor the federal court had
acquired jurisdiction under the statute.2  On appeal the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of the lower court and,
without deciding the validity of the plaintiff's cause of action, held that the
District Court had obtained jurisdiction under the statute, since the plaintiff's
claim as pleaded was not so unsubstantial as to be completely without merit.3
It is a well established doctrine that the vendee under an executory con-
tract for the sale of land has an equitable lien on the land for purchase
money advanced where the contract fails or is rescinded by the vendee due
to fault of the vendor.4 The extension of this principle to contracts involv-
ing personalty has occasioned a conflict of authority. The prevailing view,
however, has sanctioned use of the device in the case of chattel contracts,
at least where the purchaser has received possession of the personalty ;5 in
fact, under the Uniform Sales Act, a buyer entitled to rescind is expressly
granted a lien upon the goods in his possession.6 Enforcemept of the lien
thus recognized has been secured in some cases by equitable foreclosure
2. Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 14 F. Supp. 459 (W. D. Mo. 1936), (1936)
50 HAuv. L. REv. 138.
3. Thompson v. Terminal Shares, No. 10,731 (C. C. A. 8th, April 13, 1937).
4. 3 BLACK, RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION (2d ed. 1929) § 694; 2 JoNEs, LIENs
(3d ed. 1914) §§ 1105, 1106; 3 PoMERoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1263;
Note (1926) 45 A. L. R. 352.
5. Truman's Pioneer Stud Farm v. Hansen, 108 Kan. 717, 196 Pac. 1087 (1921);
Scott v. Clarkson's Executrix, 4 Ky. 277 (1808); Witte v. Hobolth, 224 Mich. 286,
195 N. W. 82 (1923) ; Giarratano v. McIlwain, 215 App. Div. 644, 214 N. Y. Supp. 582
(3d Dep't 1926); Baranofsky v. Weiss, 120 Pa. Super. 126, 182 Atl. 47 (1935); Alex-
ander v. Walker, 239 S. W. 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Free Sewing Machine Co. v.
Atkin Furniture Co., 71 S. W. (2d) 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Hall v. Bank of
Baldwin, 143 Wis. 303, 127 N. W. 969 (1910) ; Mycock v. Beatson, 13 Ch. D. 384 (1878) ;
see 20 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1931) § 719; Comment (1934) 33 Micu.
L. REv. 108, 113 et seq. Contra: Pe6ple's Electric Ry. v. McKcen Motor Car Co., 214
Fed. 73 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914) ; National Cash Register Co. v. Hude, 119 Miss. 36, 80 So.
378 (1919). The lien has been restricted to cases where the defendant was insolvent.
Apple v. Edwards, 92 Mont. 524, 16 P. (2d) 700 (1932) ; Hackney Mfg. Co. v. Celum,
189 S. W. 988 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
6. Section 69 (5) of the UNIFORM SALES ACT provides: "Where the buyer is
entitled to rescind the sale and elects to do so, if the seller refuses to accept an offer of
the buyer to return the goods, the buyer shall thereafter be deemed to hold the goods
as bailee for the seller, but subject to a lien to secure the repayment of any portion
of the price which has been paid, and with the remedies for the enforcement of such
lien allowed to an unpaid seller by section 53."
A buyer is not entitled to a lien under the Act where his rescission is induced by
the seller's fraud and not by the seller's breach of warranty. Sammis v. Marks, 69
Utah 26, 252 Pac. 270 (1926). The lien granted by the Act does not preclude equitable
jurisdiction to grant a lien for purchase money advanced. Goldberg v. Minerva Auto-
mobiles, 278 Ill. App. 217 (1934).
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and public sale,7 in accordance with the normal procedure in land cases; s
the Uniform Sales Act9 and a few courts acting without statutory author-
ity"0 have also permitted enforcement of the lien by the quicker and simpler
method of resale, either public or private. In other jurisdictions where the
right of resale has not been acknowledged, the buyer's interest in the goods
has been viewed as analogous in effect to a common law lien, conferring
upon him at least a right to the retention of the property as security for
restitution." While an interest such as the vendee's lien, unless conferred
by statute, is enforceable only in a court of equity, a number of common law
courts, adopting a somewhat similar approach, have recognized the buyer's
interest in the subject matter of the contract where the contract fails or is
rescinded after payment has been made. Thus, the purchaser's interest in
goods received has been held sufficient to defeat an action of replevin;"-
and it appears that the buyer's tender of the property conditioned upon a
return of purchase money paid is enough to satisfy the requirement of
restitution as a condition precedent to recovery at law on the theory of
rescission;13 it has even been held that subsequent to a conditional tender
of the property and pending decision on the action to rescind, the buyer is
entitled to the use of the property.' 4 In the light of this tendency of the
7. Giarratano v. McIlwain, 215 App. Div. 644, 214 N. Y. Supp. 582 (3d Dep't
1926); Free Machine Co. v. Atkin Furniture Co., 71 S. IV. (2d) 604 (Tex. Ch. App.
1934).
8. Hafner v. Stuart Land Co., 246 Mfich. 465, 224 N. NV. 630 (1929); Johnson v.
Berns, 111 Ore. 165, 224 Pac. 624, 225 Pac. 727 (1924).
9. Under Section 69(5) of the UNiFORm SALTs Acr the buyer is granted the reme-
dies for the enforcement of his lien allowed an unpaid seller by section 53. Section 53
provides that the seller has "(c) A right of resale as limited by this act." Section
60 (4), (5) permits resale either by public or private sale and without notice to the
other party of the time or place of resale. Brown & Co: v. Darling & Co., 233 App.
Div. 487, 264 N. Y. Supp. 792 (4th Dept, 1933) (public sale); Wilson & Co. v. Wertz
Co., 104 Ohio St. 507, 136 N. E. 202 (1922) (private sale). The buyer may sell to himself
if he exercised "reasonable care" in making the resale. Ibid.
10. Alexander v. Walker, 239 S. V. 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 19.") (public sale);
Truman's Pioneer Stud Farm v. Hansen, 108 Kan. 717, 196 Pac. 1037 (1921) (private
sale).
11. Hall. v. Bank of Baldwin, 143 Wis. 303, 127 N. IV. 969 (1910); see Apple v.
Edwards, 92 Mont. 524, 536, 16 P. (2d) 700, 704 (1932). A forliori, the Uniform Sales
Act authorizes retention of the goods as security. Land Finance Corp. v. Sherwin
Electric Co., 102 Vt. 73, 146 AtL. 72 (1929).
12. Wellington-Stone Co. v. Thomas, 11 La. App. 242, 123 So. 410 (1929); Auto
Brokerage Co. v. Ullrich, 102 N. J. Law 341, 131 AUt. 901 (1926); cf. Southern Iron
& Equipment Co. v. Bamberg, E. & V. Ry., 151 S. C. 506, 149 S. E. 271 (1929).
13. Whiting v. Squeglia, 70 Cal. App. 108, 232 Pac. 9,6 (1924); see Liquid Car-
bonic Co. v. Cochin, 161 S. C 40, 46, 159 S. F. 461, 464 (1931); ef. Keefe v. Jeffer-
son, 151 Minn. 368,186 N. IV. 789 (1922) ; Sisson v. Hill, 18 _. 1.212,26 AtL 196 (1393).
The Uniform Sales Act has been held to authorize a conditional tender. Levy v. Chona-
vitz, 163 N. Y. Supp. 658 (County Ct. 1917); Feinman v. Weil, 105 Misc. 298, 173
N. Y. Supp. 11 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
14. Egan v. Parks, 111 Cal. App. 415, 295 Pac. 866 (1931); cf. Plotkin v. Galo-
witz, 109 N. J. Eq. 304, 157 At. 153 (Ch. 1931). But cf. Grainger Bros. Co. v. Am-
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courts to permit a plaintiff at law to retain the consideration received for
the purchase price as security against possible failure to obtain full restitu-
tion, it has been suggested that in the future resort to equity for the enforce-
ment of a vendee's lien of non-statutory origin may become necessary,
especially if a power of resale for the vendor's account is eventually recog-
nized at law. 15
Although many courts have recognized vendees' liens, theories as to the
actual basis of the lien are in utter conflict,16 a result apparently attributable
to the efforts to justify logically a doctrine evolved by the courts on a
practical level. The plaintiff in the instant case advanced the theory that
since equity considers the vendee the equitable owner of the land from the
moment the contract is executed, a rationalization allegedly developed to
explain the vendee's right to specific performance of the contract, the vendee's
lien on the land was based directly on his right to specific performance.1 7
This premise led to the conclusion that since the contract for the purchase
of securities was also specifically enforceable, the plaintiff as purchaser was
entitled to a vendee's lien on the personalty. The theory is not too con-
vincing inasmuch as the vendee's lien on land has been recognized in many
cases in which the contract was not specifically enforceable,' 8 and since,
further, there would appear to be no sound reason for favoring the purchaser
of unique chattels over the buyer of non-unique goods. In the last analysis,
the vendee's lien appears to be no more than a remedial device developed
by equity to do justice between the parties by giving the vendee a security
interest against retention of both land and money by the vendor.' 0 From
this viewpoint, there appears to be no reason for not employing the concept
in favor of a wronged buyer of personalty,20 unless the rights of innocent
third parties are involved.
sinck & Co., 15 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Mallow v. Hall, 209 Wis. 426,
245 N. W. 90 (1932).
15. Comment (1934) 33 MicHi. L. REv. 108, 114.
16. See Brown, Vendec's Lien for Purchase Money (1922) 95 CENT. L. J. 42; Com-
ment (1923) 7 Mxx. L. REv. 231, 233; Comment (1932) 1 MERcER BEASELY L. REV.
70, 75; (1908) 8 COL. L. REV. 571.
17. See Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 14 F. Supp. 459, 461-462 (W. D. Mo. 1936) ;
Memorandum of Professor Walter W. Cook, Plaintiff's brief in the District Court, p.
121 el seq.; Bowman v. Adams, 45 Idaho 217, 225-226, 261 Pac. 679, 681-682 (1927);
cf. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 CoL L. REV. 369.
18. See Note (1926) 45 A. L. R. 352, 360 and cases cited.
19. See Gerstell v. Shirk, 210 Fed. 223, 229 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913); Carpenter v.
Dummit, 221 Ky. 67, 79, 297 S. W. 695, 700 (1927) ; Apple v. Edwards, 92 Mont. 524,
537, 16 P. (2d) 700, 704 (1932); Williston, Transfers of After-Acquired Personal
Property (1906) 19 HARv. L. REV. 557; Comment (1930) 4 U. or CINN. L, REv. 368,
372; cf. Comment (1934) 32 MicH. L. REV. 685.
20. Objection to extending the doctrine to contracts involving personalty has been
made on the ground that, pending the court's decree, the property might be removed
beyond its jurisdiction. Gerstell v. Shirk, 210 Fed. 223 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913). But this
difficulty could be obviated by impounding the property prior to the action or by
enjoining its transfer.
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In the case of a vendee's lien on land, the lien does not depend on a
retention of possession by the vendee.21 Cases have held, however, both at
common lav 22 and under the Sales Act,m that possession is essential to the
existence of the vendee's lien on chattels; and it is at least certain that
where, as in the instant case, the vendee under a contract for the sale of
personalty has not received possession of the property, the standing of his
lien for the purchase money advanced must be examined in the light of
different considerations. Determination of the status of such a lien, an
interest whose recognition runs counter to the traditional policy of basing
security interests on possession or public record, entails a resolution of con-
flicting social policies. On the one hand is a tendency to refuse enforcement
of a creditor's right to property in the possession of a debtor and so far
subject to his control and use as to deceive other creditors into dealing with
him under a belief of full ownership. Against this must be weighed the
desirability of permitting the borrower to obtain the maximum amount of
credit-a consequence which enforcement of the lender's lien naturally
entails. 24 In the instant case, however, it is not necessary to determine the
advisability of enforcing a secret lien from this viewpoint, for the case
merely involves the rights of immediate parties to the contract, or parties
with notice; 2a and in any event there would seem to be slight possibility
in such a situation of penalizing innocent third parties by enforcing the
lien, for while the securities were not in the buyer's possession, they were
also not within the seller's control or apparent ownership. Since the equities
of the case appear to lie with the plaintiff,20 and since the vendor is in-
solvent, there would appear to be no good reason for refusing to guaranty
the plaintiff, as a wronged party, complete restitution by giving him a security
interest in the stocks and bonds forming the subject matter of the contract.2
21. Bullitt v. Eastern Ky. Land Co., 99 Ky. 324, 36 S.NN. 16 (1896); Elterman
v. Hyman, 192 N.Y. 113, 84 N.E. 937 (1908).
22. Bowman v. Adams, 45 Idaho 217, 261 Pac. 679 (1927); Allen v. Shortridge,
1 Duv. 34 (Ky. 1863); Johnson v. Berns, Ill Ore. 165, 224 Pac. 624, 225 Pac. 727
(1924).
23. In re Tuduri's Estate, 156 fisc. 317, 2S1 N. Y. Supp. 630 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
24. See Britton, Equitable Liens-A Tcntathe Analysis of the Problem (1930)
8 N. C. L. R-v. 388, 399.
25. See Thompson v. Terminal Shares, No. 10,731 (C. C. A. 8th, April 13, 1937)
(fourth paragraph of opinion).
26. Plaintiff alleged that the vendor corporation vwas the wholly owned subsidiary
of the Alleghany Corporation, a non-resident defendant, which also controlled the
voting stock of the vendee, the Missouri Pacific Railroad; that 0. P. Van Sweringen,
who was the chairman of the board of both the vendee and the Alleghany Corporation,
and who controlled the latter corporation with his brother, had instigated the vendee's
purchase of the securities in the interest of the Alleghany Corporation, the real vendor,
in an effort to recoup a depression shrinkage of value by unloading the securities on
the vendee at pre-depression prices.
27. There is authority for declaring a vendee's lien even where the vendee is not
in possession of the personalty. Pratt v. Weeks, 9 F. Supp. 953 (S. D. Fla. 1932);
Armstrong & Co. v. Darbro, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 984 (1889); Kline v. Cofield, 159 Ky.
744, 169 S.W. 477 (1914); Carpenter v. Dummit, 221 Ky. 67, 297 S.V. 695 (1927)
(vendee's lien on stock); Svrainston v. Clay, 3 DeG., J. & S. *557 (1863); Levy v.
Stogdon, [1891] 1 Ch. 478.
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COMPULSORY LICENSING AND THE PATENT POOL PROBLEM*
THE PATENT pool, affording reciprocal patent privileges to its members, is
a common feature of industries dependent upon patents.' Whenever basic
patents are controlled by interests hostile to owners of improvement patents,
or numerous letters patent have been issued which mutually overlap, man-
ufacture of the patented articles is impossible and cooperative action to break
the deadlock becomes imperative. 2 This cooperative action may take the
form of either a pooling of patent rights by a series of cross-licensing agree-
ments or an assignment of patents to a central unit which issues compre-
hensive licenses to subscribers.3 By exploitation of patents in combination
the pool achieves a dominating position in the industry which may develop
into a monopoly far more extensive than could be attained by independent
exercise of the individual privileges 4 and which may extend even beyond
the ambit of protection intended by the patent laws - thereby exposing the
licensing practices of the pool to attacks under the anti-trust legislation.5
The sanctions prescribed for the enforcement of the anti-trust laws appear
ill adapted to resolve the problems presented by the patent pool. Injunctions
by the government compelling dissolution of the pools may prove more
harmful to the public than the practices sought to be condemned.0 The pro-
vision for private triple damage actions has appeared equally impotent, since
strict requirements of proof make recovery difficult.7 A possible solution of
the problem is suggested, however, by a recent suit for injunctive relief
arising under Section 16 of the Clayton Act.8 An independent manufacturer
of radio apparatus petitioned the Federal District Court of Delaware for
a mandatory injunction compelling the Radio Corporation of America to
issue him a license to manufacture under all patents controlled by a pool of
* F. A. D. Andrea, Inc. v. Radio Corp. of America, 14 F. Supp. 226 (Del. 1936),
aff'd, 88 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), cert. denied, (1937) 4 U. S. L. WEEC 943.
1. See VAUGHAN, EcONomicS OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM (1925) c. 2.
2. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, THEIR
EcoNOMIc SIGNIFICANCE AND LEGAL STATUS (1925) c. 9; Vaughan, The Relation of
Patents to Industrial Monopolies (1932) 14 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 61, 95.
3. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70 (1902) ; Standard Sanitary Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20 (1912); Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg.
Co., 166 Fed. 555 (C. C. Mass. 1909).
4. See Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 48 (1912);
Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 166 Fed. 555, 562 (C. C. Mass. 1909).
5. See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1297. It has been definitely established
that patented articles are subject to the anti-trust laws. Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502 (1917) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
283 U. S. 163 (1931).
6. The impossibility of effectual enforcement of the criminal provisions of the
anti-trust laws has been demonstrated by the necessity for supplementary remedies
permitting private parties to initiate enforcement proceedings. See in!ra, p. 1405, for
a discussion of the beneficial functions of patent pools.
7. See Comments (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 503; (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 335.
8. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §26 (1934).
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which it was, in effect, the sole licensing agency.' It was alleged that the
Radio Corporation had, by means of agreements for the interchange of patent
rights, acquired the status of an illegal monopoly in the radio apparatus
industry, that it had employed its position to restrain trade in interstate com-
merce, and that its refusal to grant petitioner a license would necessitate dis-
solution of his manufacturing enterprise.' 0 The court granted a motion to
dismiss the bill, holding that the relief demanded was not of the kind con-
templated by Section 16 of the Clayton Act, and that a violation of the
anti-trust laws had never required the forfeiture of a patent privilege to
anyone injured by its exercise. This decree was affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and a writ of certiorari was denied
by the United States Supreme Court."
Although the relief demanded in the principal case has been sought before,'2
it has never been granted. But the cases relied upon by the defendant as
determinative involved suits for infringement in which cross-bills asldng
for compulsory licenses were stricken out because of the irrelevancy of the
issues sought to be introduced into the infringement controversies, 3 and
because of failure to allege an injury special to the petitioner as distinct
from a general injury to the public -an averment held essential to a proper
bill for relief under Section 16.14 The bill in the principal case is dearly
not vulnerable to the first exception, since no infringement claims were in-
volved, and in view of the allegation of special damage it appears equally
unassailable under the second.2r Consequently the court might well have
9. Under a consent decree entered in a suit by the government charging the Radio
Corporation with monopolistic tendencies [United States v. Radio Corp., 3 F. Supp. 23
(Del. 1933)], the subscribers to the pool were authorized to issue licenses to outsiders
under their individually owned patents. Comment (1933) 1 Gwo. WAsn. L. REv. 513.
The Radio Corporation retained the power to issue comprehensive licenses, one of
which was sought by petitioner in the principal case.
10. For an account of the development and structure of the radio patent pool, see
VAUGHAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 64-67; RF.oRT OF THE FEuLL. Trum Co..assIo.
ox THE RADio INDUSTRY (1924).
11. F. A. D. Andrea, Inc. v. Radio Corp. of America, 14 F. Supp. 226 (Del. 1936),
aff'd, 88 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), cert. denied, (1937) 4 U. S. Li. NVaen 943.
12. General Electric Co. v. Minneapolis Electric Lamp Co., 10 F. (2d) 851 (Minn.
1924); Radio Corp. v. United Radio & Electric Corp., 50 F. (2d) 205 (N. J. 1926);
Radio Corp. v. Majestic Distributors, 53 F. (2d) 641 (Conn. 1931), (1932) 45 HAnv.
L. REv. 1118; Radio Corp. of America v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., 10 F. Supp. 879
(N. J. 1934).
13. See note 12, supra. It is settled that an allegation that a patentee has violated
the anti-trust laws is not a proper defense to an infringement suit. Radio Corp. v.
Hygrade Sylvania Corp., 10 F. Supp. 879 (N. J. 1934).
14. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921); see Radio Corp.
v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., 10 F. Supp. 879, 884 (N. J. 1934); Radio Corp. v. Duov-ac
Radio Tube Corp., 6 F. Supp. 275, 277 (E. D. N. Y. 1931).
15. In the principal case the bill alleged that the refusal to license petitioner was
part of a plan to restrain trade generally and to compel this competitor in particular
to leave the radio apparatus manufacturing trade completely. Such an allegation, aside
from the question of its substantiation, would appear adequate to satisfy the require-
ments of Section 16. See Western Electric Co., Inc. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 53 F.
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distinguished these earlier cases and resolved the issues, as ultimately they
must be, upon considerations of the social and economic policy underlying
the patent laws and the privileges they are designed to protect. 10
The primary purpose of the present patent system is to promote the
sciences and useful arts by insuring the inventor a reward commensurate
with the commercial success of his discovery.' Congress has stipulated the
manner in which this reward is to be realized by conferring on the patentee
the exclusive right to make, use, and vend his device for a limited period
of time.' s Although the courts have circumscribed the purposes for which
the resulting monopoly may be employed, 19 the patentee has been protected
in the enjoyment of the basic privilege of excluding others from the exploi-
tation of his discovery.20  Compulsory licensing would appear to deprive
the patentee of this power of exclusion, but when viewed in the light of
actual patent practice no substantial departure from established formulae
would result. The vast majority of patents are now exploited upon a royalty
basis by which the inventor is compensated according to a schedule deter-
mined by contract. If the patentee were required to license applicants subject
to the terms and conditions imposed upon existing licensees, no alteration
would be required in the method by which the inventor's remuneration
would be computed. Moreover, where a discovery is exploited exclusively
on a royalty basis, the return to the patentee might possibly be increased
by virtue of the additional units produced by the new licensee.2 '
(2d) 639, 641 (S. D. N. Y. 1930) ; Radio Corp. v. 'Majestic Distributors, 53 F. (2d)
641, 643 (Conn. 1931).
16. The only precedent discovered by counsel for petitioner to support his claim
was a dictun of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S.
163, 172 (1931): "Unless the industry is dominated, or interstate commerce directly
restrained, the Sherman Act does not require cross-licensing patentees to license at
reasonable rates others engaged in interstate commerce." The interpretation of this
sentence which was pressed by the petitioner-that licensing might under proper cir-
cumstances be required-was discarded by the court as the Justice was concerned
with the imposition of onerous rates and no plea for a license was involved. The
decisions of the courts upon patent questions have been determined on questions of
policy rather than legal precedent. Powell, The Nature of a Patent Right (1917) 17
CoL.. L. Ray. 663, 681, 684.
17. See TOULTIN, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS (1937) § 94;
Comment (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 246, 251.
18. 46 STAT. 376 (1930), 35 U. S. C. §40 (1934), enacted pursuant to U. S. CoNST.
Art. I, § 8.
19. Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1 (1913) ; United States v. Schrader's
Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920) (attempted control over resale prices of the patented
article) ; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502 (1917) (at-
tempted control over supplies and accessories for the patented article) ; Carbice v.
American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27 (1931) (attempted control over unpatented articles
used in combination). But cf. Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213
U. S. 325 (1909). See TRADE ASSOClATIONS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 133; Barnett,
"Within His Domain the Patentee is Czar" (1935) 17 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 92, 95, 105.
20. TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 130, 147.
21. Where the patentee is himself engaged in the commercial exploitation of an
invention, the royalties derived from the competitor-licensee might not compensate
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Even though compulsory licensing should entail some variation from pres-
ent patent doctrine - as distinguished from actual practice - a modification
might be justified by the dictates of a superior public policy, especially since
patent privileges have always been held subject to state police regulations, --
the right of eminent domain,2 3 and obligations of user.2  In the case
of the patent pool, strict adherence to patent ideology may result in a
monopoly irreconcilable with the policy of the anti-trust leIslation- pre-
servation of the competitive system.2 To the extent that compulsory licens-
ing would resolve this conflict and at the same time retain the essential
benefits of the pools, there seems to be no objection to the adoption of this
remedy by the courts. In the initial stages of a pool's development compe-
tition is stimulated: the patent deadlock is broken; the cost of infringement
avoided; and the parties are free to produce articles with the combined
improvements represented by numerous patents.20 After the basic patents
expire, however, the pool is perpetuated only by reason of its control over
minor patents, its suppression of new discoveries, and its power to compel
the transfer of new patents to the combination. -  The expense of patent
litigation will generally force compliance with the terms dictated by the
pool, for the penalty of refusal may be infringement which the inventor will
be powerless to enjoin and which may destroy the marketability of his
product.2  Furthermore, considerable coercion may be exercised by a pool
due to its bargaining position as virtually the sole purchaser of patents in
the trade. Although, at this stage of its growth, the pool may be said to
have outlived its economic and social justification, dissolution would prob-
ably produce a second deadlock and would certainly terminate the coopera-
tive research characteristic of this type of industrial organization.20 A system
of compulsory licenses, on the other hand, would in no way interfere with
the effective operation of the pools and would infiltrate new competitors
to dilute the monopoly from which their evils are said to arise. Since the
courts will not take the initiative in arriving at a broader construction of
for the loss of an advantageous trade position. In the case of the patent pool, however,
the manufacturing patentee might suffer no injurious effects from such a licensing
policy, in view of the reciprocal patent privileges incident to membership in the com-
bination. Toulmin, Patent Pools and Cross Liceises (1935) 22 V.. L REv. 119, 144,
et. seq.
22. Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S.,501 (1878); Allen v. Riley, 203 U. S. 347(1906); John Woods & Sons v. Carl, 203 U. S. 358 (1906); Ozan Lumber Co. v.
Union County Nat. Bank, 207 U. S. 251 (1907).
23. Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U. S. 290 (1912).
24. Missouri v. Bell Telephone Co., 23 Fed. 539 (C. C. E. D. 'Mo. 1835), app.
dismissed. 127 U. S. 780 (1833) ; State v. Delaware & A. T. & T. Co., 47 Fed. 633 (C. C.
Del. 1891), aff'd, 50 Fed. 677 (C. C. A. 3d, 1892).
25. See VAUGnA., op. cit. supra note 1, at pp. 34, 224.
26. See TouLI-II, op. cit. supra note 17, § 91; VAUGHA.%, op. cit. supra note 1, at
70, 71; Toulmin, op. cit. supra note 21, passim.
27. See Comment (1936) 7 Aut L. R v. 98. 104, 105.
28. See VAUGHAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 152.
29. See Radio Corp. v. United Radio and Elec. Corp., 50 F. (2d) 206 (N. J. 1926).
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the patent statutes,30 as is evident from the principal case, it remains for the
legislature to recognize the obsolescence of the present patent system with
a view toward adapting it to modern industrial conditions.81 Legislation
providing for compulsory licenses is said to have been successful abroad 2
and is not without precedent in the United States. 3 In those industries,
such as the radio industry, where the public interest may be directly con-
cerned with the practices of the trade, the need for regulation appears urgent.
In view of the availability of the regulatory machinery provided by the Com-
munications Commission, by which broadcasting stations are already sub-
jected to penalties supplementary to the Clayton Act,3 4 it might be well to
refer manufacturing as well as communication practices to that body, which
is in the most favorable position to regulate the industry in the public interest.
ACCRUED INTEREST TAXABLE AS INCOME TO MORTGAGEE BIDDING IN AT
FORECLOSURE SALE*
A LIFE insurance company foreclosed several farm mortgages and, as the
only bidder at the foreclosure sales, bought in the properties at amounts
equalling the principal of the loans and accrued interest. The bids were
made without regard to actual value for the purpose of avoiding potential
loss which might result from exercise by the mortgagors and junior lienors
of their statutory power to redeem at the bid price plus interest from the
date of foreclosure.' The company, keeping books on a cash-receipts-and-
30. The patent law has developed by growth and judicial decision rather than
legislative enactments. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 20 U. S. 356 (1822) ; Grant v. Ray-
mond, 31 U. S. 218 (1832) ; Leeds & Catlin v. Victor, 213 U. S. 325 (1909) ; Ashley v.
Tatum, 240 Fed. 979 (S. D. N.Y. 1917). See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 954, 959.
31. Considerable dissatisfaction with the present patent system has been expressed.
See VAUGHAN, Op. cit. supra note 1, c. 8; Comments (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 954, 960,
(1928) 38 YALE L. J. 246, 251.
32. See Benjamin, Compulsory License Suits in Germany (1935) 17 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc. 962. England has a provision authorizing a compulsory exclusive license exclud-
ing even the inventor. Id. at 964.
33. Early patents provided for maximum royalties, loss of patent privileges for
non-use, and compulsory training of apprentices. South Carolina had a compulsory
licensing statute. Schechter, Compulsory Licensing of Patents (1936) 22 VA. L. REv.
287, 303-306. Compare the provisions of Section 1 of the Copyright Law, 35 STAT. 1075,
1088 (1909) 17 U. S. C. § 1 (1934).
34. The Communications Commission may refuse a broadcasting license to any ap-
plicant who has previously been adjudged a violator of the anti-trust laws. 48 STAT.
1087 (1934), 47 U.S. C. §313 (1934).
* Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 423 (Feb. 15, 1937).
1. Most of the properties were located in Michigan, where the owner is given a
year in which to redeem at that figure. MIcH. Comp. LAvs (1929) c. 266, §§ 14435,
14436. Redemption statutes, varying in their provisions, exist in a majority of the
states. See 32 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS (1922) 280.
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disbursements basis, recorded its investment in the properties at amounts
including principal and costs of foreclosure but not accrued interest. Over
the company's objection that the properties actually were worth even less
th;n the principal, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the
accrued interest as part of gross income. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed
the Commissioner's ruling 2 but was reversed by the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which remanded the case for a finding of the properties' fair market
value.3 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the mortgagee had in
legal effect received full payment of the accrued interest, that it constituted
taxable income, and that inquiry into market value of the properties would
only hamper tax administration.4
The decision that taxable income was thus received is based upon two
fictions. The first is that there were two separate and distinct transactions
involved in the same deal- one the purchase of real property, the other
the payment of a debt. For the purpose of taxation, the effect of the trans-
actions was deemed the same as if the purchase had been made with cash
and this money in turn applied by the mortgagor to the payment of the
principal and accrued interest ;r there was no actual exchange of cash only
because the same parties participated in both transactions.0 The second
fiction is that the purchase was in terms of an even exchange: that is, that
the properties were worth the total of the principal and accrued interest,
and, if not worth that much in the open market, at least the bid accorded
with the company's estimate of the value of the land to itself. Part of that
value was the collateral benefit of protection against an unfavorable redemp-
tion which the insurance company evidently preferred to its alternative of
taking a deficiency judgment for the difference between the amounts due
and the actual value of the properties.7
The weakness of these fictions becomes apparent from an examination of
the realities of the situation. Foreclosure sales are usually attended solely
by the mortgagee, whose primary interest is not to purchase land as an
2. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 31 B. T. A. 1249 (1934).
3. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 83 F. (2d) 6279
(C. C. A. 6th, 1936).
4. Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 57 Sup. CL 423 (Feb. 15, 1937)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting), (1937) 50 HArv. L. R%,. 988, 85 U. oF PA. L Ray. 741.
5. See Silver v. Wickfield Farms, 209 Iowa 856, 861, 227 N. W. 97, 99 (1929);
Ledyard v. Phillips, 47 Mich. 305, 303, 11 N. V. 170, 171 (182).
6. Once the fiction is accepted, the doctrine of constructive receipt of cash in-
come is applicable. See Magill, The Taxation of Unrcaliued Income (1925) 39 HARv.
L. Rav. 82. Since this doctrine in effect deprives the taxpayer of his right to report
on a cash basis, the courts have insisted that it be sparingly applied "lest it become a
means for taxing something other than income and thus violating the Constitution."
John A. Brander, 3 B. T. A. 231, 235 (1925) ; Hal E. Roach, 20 B. T. A. 919, 924-925
(1930). That the ruling in the principal case represents a strained application of the
doctrine, see Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 83 F. (2d) 629, 631
(C. C. A. 6th, 1936); 1 PAUL AND MERTrNs, FFanuAL Ixoi TAXA'zon (Supp. 1936)
§ 10.09A, n. 38c.
7. Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 423, 426-427 (Feb. 15,
1937).
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investor but to salvage something from his loan.8 This is especially true
where redemption statutes are in force, for would-be purchasers are dis-
couraged by the provision that neither possession nor full title are to pass
to them until the end of the redemption period. 9 Consequently, the bid price
almost invariably has no relation to the worth of the property;, and often,
as was true in the instant case, the figure is well in excess of market value
because of a desire to protect against an unfavorable redemption.10 Under
these circumstances, taxation of accrued interest constitutes an exaction upon
unrealized income. The mortgagee's cash ability to pay any tax clearly has
not been enhanced. Actually he has suffered a loss with little prospect of
realizing any part of the original loan at least until the end of the redemp-
tion period, when he has his first real opportunity to dispose of the land.11
Life insurance companies, particularly, suffer from the decision in the
instant case. Since 1921, their gross income has been limited to interest, rents,
and dividends- the so-called "investment income"' 2 --- and neither bad debt
losses nor capital gains and losses figure in their returns.13 As a result, once
taxed on the interest included in their bid, they, unlike all other taxpayers,
cannot partially compensate themselves either by establishing a capital loss
at the time of foreclosure, 14 or by deducting as a capital loss on resale the
8. See Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 445-446 (1934).
The mortgagee is "primarily a lender and a purchaser only through necessity . .
Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 83 F. (2d) 629, 630
(C. C. A. 6th, 1936).
9. Michigan Trust Co. v. Lansing Lumber Co., 103 Mich. 392, 402, 61 N. W.
668, 671 (1894); Durfee and Doddridge, Redcnption from Foreclosure Sale (1925)
23 MicH. L. REv. 825, 843; Carey, Brabner-Smith, and Sullivan, Foreclosure Methods
and Redemption (1933) 27 ILL. L. REV. 595, 615.
10. Helvering v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 423, 425 (Feb. 15, 1937).
11. See note 9, supra.
12. §244 (a), REv. AcTs OF 1921, 1924, 1926; §202 (a), REV. ACTS OF 1928, 1932,
1934, and 1936; Independent Life Ins. Co. of America, 17 B. T. A. 757, 761 (1929).
13. § 245, REv. AcTs or 1921, 1924, 1926; § 203 (a), REv. ACTS OF 1928, 1932, 1934,
1936; Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co., 18 B. T. A. 1240 (1930); Volunteer State Life Ins.
Co., 27 B. T. A. 1149 (1933).
14. Under the treasury regulations, when a creditor other than a life insurance
company buys in mortgaged property and applies the obligations of the debtor to the
purchase price, he is entitled to show that the fair market value of the property is
actually less than the amount of the debtor's obligations so used, and to deduct the
difference as a capital loss. U. S. Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 153 (1926) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 74,
Art. 193 (1928); U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 193 (1932); U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art.
23 (k)-3 (1934); U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 23 (k)-3 (1936); 371 C. C. H. 1937 Fed.
Tax Serv. 209.025; Hulse, Mortgage Foreclosures Under the Federal Income Tax
Regulations (1936) 14 TAX MAG. 451. Accrued interest is expressly excluded from
this computation except when it has previously been returned as income. 3 PAUL AND
MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOcm TAXATION (1934) § 28.78, n. 48. Thus, when the taxpayer
bids in at principal plus accrued interest, and the property is admittedly worth less
than the principal, there is a varying degree of hardship:
(a) Deduction allowed to those reporting on an accrual basis = principal + accrued
interest returned as income in previous years - fair market value of the property.
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difference between the bid price and the amount then realized.15 Thus, it is
to be expected that, as the largest investors in farm mortgages in the coun-
try,'8 life insurance companies should be the most vigorous opponents of this
taxation of "imaginary interest."' 7 But the decision may also work hardship
upon the mortgagor. To escape taxation of the accrued interest, mortgagees
may reduce their bids to the amount of the principal and take deficiency judg-
ments for the balance, thereby increasing the mortgagor's burden- a result
contrary to the modern legislative policy of protecting mortgagors against
the use of deficiency judgments as instruments of oppression. 8
The problem could be handled more equitably by regarding the foreclosure
sale as a single transaction. Recognition might be given to the unique char-
acter of foreclosure sales as involving not a purchase of land by the mortgagee
as an independent investment, but an exchange of one form of capital asset
(b) Deduction allowed to those other than life insurance companies reporting on a
cash basis = principal - fair market value.
(c) Life insurance companies are allowed no deductions whatsoever.
Since the market value is the basis for computing capital loss or gain on reale, and
since the bid price is presumed to be the market value only in the absence of rebuttal
(Treas. Regs., supra), the taxpayer in class (b) who shows a loss in the year of
foreclosure apparently cannot recover upon resale, as part of a possible capital loss
deduction, the amount of the accrued interest previously taxed under the decision in
the principal case. His choice, therefore, lies between taking an immediate deduction
of the difference between the principal and the fair market value, and delaying in favor
of a possible capital loss deduction upon resale including the amount of the accrued
interest [bid price (principal + accrued interest) - resale price].
15. For the provisions as to capital gains and losses for taxupayers other than life
insurance companies, see § 117, 4S ST.T. 714, 26 U. S. C. § 101 (1934). Since the Revenue
Act of 1934, the deductible losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets for such
taxpayers have been limited to $2.000 plus the capital gains for the period. 372 C. C. H.
1937 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 86S.025.
16. 288 TECHX. BULL. (Dep't of Agric. 1932) 21.
17. Practically all the litigation on the question has been instigated by life insurance
companies, and in every instance the accrued interest has been held taxable. In some
cases the market value of the properties at time of foreclosure was deemed immaterial
[Helvering v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), aff'g,
29 B. 1". A. 401 (1933) ; National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 1000 (Ct.
Cl. 1933), cert. denied mtb nora. Lucey, Receiver v. United States, 291 U. S. 633
(1934)]; in others it was ignored. American Central Life Ins. Co., 30 B. T. A. 1182
(1934); Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 33 B. T. A. 332 (1935); see Great Southern
Life Ins. Co., 33 B. T. A. 512, 522 (1935) ; cf. Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co., 18 B. T. A.
359 (1929). The only decisions involving mortgagees other than life insurance com-
panies reach the same result. M1anomet Cranberry Co., 1 B. T. A. 706 (1925) (market
value held immaterial); Ewen 'MacLennan, 20 B. T. A. 909 (1930) (market value
ignored).
18. See Louisville Joint St. Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 594, n. 24 (1935).
Although redemption statutes have not proved successful in enabling the mortgagor
to refinance himself within the period allotted, the threat of possible redemption has
benefited him by inducing the mortgagee to bid more than he otherwise would. See Na-
tional Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 1000, 1010 (Ct. CL 1933) ; Durfec and
Doddridge, .ipra note 9, at 839 et seq.
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for another. The deal could be treated as a non-taxable exchange, the land
standing in place of the debt until resale, 19 when any sum received in excess
of the principal would be taxed as income up to the amount of the accrued
interest, and anything beyond that as a capital gain.20 While this procedure
avoids the administrative difficulties of determining fair market value, it is
contrary to the dominant trend away from the notion that, to be realized,
income must be received only in cash. 21 For this reason, a more acceptable
method would be to regard the foreclosure sale simply as a transfer of
property in exchange for the cancellation of a debt.22 Determination of
whether or not any interest was received would depend on the market value
of the land. Although the bid price would still be presumed to be indicative
of such value, it would not be accorded the conclusiveness given to it by
the court in the principal case, but could be rebutted by evidence of actual
market value.2 3 This procedure is followed in determining whether income
has been received in the form of accrued interest when, instead of bidding
at a foreclosure sale, the creditor obtains the mortgaged property by volun-
tary conveyance and cancels the debt in return ;24 and there seem to be only
formal grounds for differentiating the two situations. 25 Moreover, the ob-
19. This is the method formerly used for determining gain or loss when a cred-
itor other than a life insurance company bought in mortgaged property for the amount
of the debt. U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art. 153 (1921); U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 153
(1924). In 1926 it was superseded by the method described in note 14, supra. 371
C. C. H. 1937 Fed. Tax Serv. 1209.025. Application of the above regulations was
never extended beyond the principal of the debt; when the bid price included the accrued
interest, the interest was held taxable. Manomet Cranberry Co., 1 B. T. A, 706 (1925).
20. In other words, the interest would be considered uncollected until actually re-
ceived in cash. The differentiation of the excess into interest and capital gain is impor-
tant because of the difference in the rates for taxing the two and because life insurance
companies would be taxable only on the interest.
21. 1 PAUL AND MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) § 10.01. Receipt of
the equivalent of cash may constitute income even where the taxpayer is reporting on a
cash basis, provided he has power to convert into cash. Magill, When is Income Rcal-
ized? (1933) 46 HARv. L. REV. 933, 934; MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 201-204.
The primary purpose of this doctrine is to prevent tax avoidance through indefinite
postponement of receipt of cash. 1 PAUL AND MERTENS, su pra § 11.04.
22. That is, that the taxpayer has been paid in property as the equivalent of cash.
This is to be distinguished from the constructive receipt doctrine. See note 6, supra.
Both cash and equivalent-of-cash income may be constructively received.
23. The presumption of an even exchange is predicated on the theory of an open
market sale between a willing buyer and a willing seller. Where the situation has
clearly been shown to be otherwise, the courts have found the property received to be
of a value different from the price paid. Troxel Manufacturing Co., 1 B. T. A. 653
(1925) ; Herbert N. Fell, 18 B. T. A. 81 (1929) ; Suncrest Lumber Co., 25 B. T. A. 375
(1932). Under the treasury regulations, taxpayers other than life insurance companies
are expressly empowered to rebut the presumption of even exchange in computing de-
ductible loss when, as creditors, they buy mortgaged or pledged property with the
debtor's obligations. See note 14, supra.
24. Henry Heldt, 16 B. T. A. 1035 (1929); American Central Life Ins. Co., 30
B. T. A. 1182 (1934) ; Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 33 B. T. A. 332 (1935).
25. In fact the mortgagee is actually in a worse position when he buys the prop-
erty at foreclosure sale; for he suffers both a delay in obtaining full title and the
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jection that inquiry into fair market value entails administrative inconveni-
ence lacks cogency in light of the fact that the treasury regulations ex-
pressly permit such an inquiry for the benefit of mortgagees other than life
insurance companies seeking to establish a capital loss arising from the
foreclosure sale.20 This method would not deprive the government of reve-
nue to which it is entitled, for the presumption that the bid price and the
market value are equal apparently could be rebutted by the government as
well as by the taxpayer. 27
MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION OF MOTOR VEHICLE OWNER FOR DEATH
CAUSED By DEFECTIVE BRAKES *
DEFECTIVE brakes were the proximate cause of an accident in which a
roofer's truck struck and killed a pedestrian.' A New York statute provides
that "Every motor vehicle . . . shall be provided with adequate brakes... "-
and that a violation of this section shall constitute a misdemeanor. The owner
and his driver, both of whom knew that the truck's brakes were defective,
were found guilty of second-degree manslaughter based on culpable negli-
gence,4 although the owner was not in the vehicle at the time of the accident.5
The case represents a rare instance of manslaughter conviction of a motor
vehicle owner absent from the scene of the accident; and one of the very
few manslaughter cases based on knowledge of defective equipment. The
expansion of vicarious civil liability, aimed primarily at compensating parties
injured by motor vehicles,6 -has been accompanied by a striking neglect of the
burden of high foreclosure costs. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of
Int. Rev., 83 F. (2d) 629, 631 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936) ; 1 PAUL AND MEam~s (Supp. 1936)
§ 10.09A.
26. See note 14, supra. In almost all cases where property other than money is re-
ceived, its fair market value has to be determined. PEAncr, Iz;co=x TAX Fu.,NDAH-x;TALS
(1937) 34.
27. The treasury regulations providing for the ascertainment of a capital loss at
the time of foreclosure state simply that the presumption of an even exchange is not
conclusive. See U. S. Treasury Regulations, supra note 14. Seemingly, either the tax-
payer or the Commissioner may introduce evidence in rebuttal.
* People v. Rauch and Washington, Queens County Ct. N. Y., N. Y. Times, Feb.
26, 1937, p. 10, col. 5.
1. There was evidence of faulty steering mechanism as well. Apparently the con-
viction might have been based on either defect.
2. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 15. 1.
3. Id. §70.1.
4. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1052 defines the common law crime of manslaughter.
5. People v. Rauch and Washington, Queens County Ct. N. Y., N. Y. Times, Feb.
26, 1937, p. 10, col. 5.
6. Nixon, Changing Rulcs of Liability it Automobile Accident Litigation (1936)
3 L w & CONTEMP. PRoB. 476. There would be little question of the civil liability of
the owner as well as the driver in the principal case. 5 BLASnlFILD, CY'COPEDA or
AuToMoBILE LAw AND PRAcrIcE (perm. ed. 1935) § 2928; 7-S HUDDY, ENCYCLO'EDIA OF
AuTomoBxx LAW (9th ed. 1931) § 88.
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possibilities of criminal responsibility as a preventive or deterrent force.
Occasionally automobile owners riding as passengers have been convicted of
manslaughter where death resulted from allowing a chauffeur to drive reck-
lessly, 7 or from permitting an intoxicated 8 or otherwise incompetent" per-
son to take the wheel. But in every instance the owner was in the car and his
criminal liability arose from his opportunity to control the driver, and not
from mere ownership. 10 Seldom have automobile owners as such been held
criminally liable, and then only in the field of minor offenses punishable
by fine." Perhaps the lack of precedent to support the manslaughter con-
viction of the absent owner in the principal case can be explained by an appar-
ent oversight of the dangers of unsafe mechanical equipment attending em-
phasis upon the personal factor. For even the drivers of cars have rarely
been convicted of manslaughter for deaths resulting from known faulty
equipment,' 2 and then usually other evidence of negligence was influential
in securing the conviction.' 3 Almost invariably their liability has rested upon
charges of driving while intoxicated, flagrant recklessness, or the violation
of state statutes regulating the manner of operation.
14
The conviction of the truck owner in the principal case, although unique,
is not without support from familiar concepts of criminal law. Liability is
imposed upon him not as owner, nor as employer, but as a party to the crime.
7. Moreland v. State, 164 Ga. 467, 139 S. E. 77 (1927), (1928) 41 HARV. L. Rrv.
398; see People v. Scanlon, 132 App. Div. 528, 535, 117 N. Y. Supp. 57, 63 (3d Dep't
1909).
8. Story v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 342 (App. D. C. 1926) ; E.x parle Liotard,
47 Nev. 169, 217 Pac. 960 (1923) ; State v. Hopkins, 147 Wash. 198, 265 Pac. 481 (1928),
cert. denied, 278 U. S. 617 (1928).
9. People v. Ingersoll, 245 Mich. 530, 222 N. W. 765 (1929) ; Armstrong v. State,
48 Okla. Cr. 146, 289 Pac. 1115 (1930).
10. Story v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 342, 344 (App. D. C. 1926): Moreland v.
State, 164 Ga. 467, 472, 139 S. E. 77, 79 (1927). This is emphasized in a similar con-
viction of one in charge of a car, though not the owner. State v. Trott, 190 N. C. 674,
130 S. E. 627 (1925). In another case, ownership was not mentioned. State v. Leonard,
195 N. C. 242, 141 S. E. 736 (1928).
11. Massachusetts has imposed absolute responsibility upon the owner for unlawful
parking. Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N. E. 601 (1934). (1935) 33 Micu.
L. REv. 443. But cf. People v. Forbath, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 767, 42 P. (2d) 108 (1935).
Under statutes limiting the number of persons to be carried in a vehicle, English courts
have fined owner-employers even though their drivers acted contrary to instructions.
Griffiths v. Studebakers Ltd., [1924] 1 K. B. 102; Gough v. Rees, 142 L. T. R. 424
(1929). But see Owners and Drivers (1934) 178 L. T. 287.
12. Largent v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 598, 97 S. W. (2d) 538 (1936) (defective
steering gear) ; State v. Wilbanks, 168 La. 861, 123 So. 600 (1929) (no lights) ; see
People v. Isbell, 363 I1. 264, 266, 2 N. E. (2d) 84, 85 (1936) (defective brakes).
13. People v. Isbell, 363 Ill. 264, 266, 2 N. E. (2d) 84, 85 (1936) (high speed);
Largent v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 598, 97 S. All. (2d) 538, 541 (1936) (passing on
a hill).
14. Benton v. State, 124 Neb. 485, 247 N. W. 21 (1933) (intoxication) ; People v.
Glasebrook, 320 Ill. 567, 151 N. E. 489 (1926) (recklessness) ; Wilson v. State, 173
Miss. 372, 161 So. 744 (1935) (speed). For a collection of cases, see 8 BLASSHFIELD,
op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 5379-5389; (1935) 99 A. L. R. 756.
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The controlling facts are that the defendant authorized another to operate
his truck with bad brakes in violation of statute, and as a proximate conse-
quence a woman was killed. The owner is as guilty of the homicide as the
driver according to the unquestioned principle that the accessory before the
fact to a lesser crime is likewise accessory to the resulting homicide.15 M-
though it has commonly been said that there can be no accessory before the
fact to manslaughter because it is by nature an act of the momfnt, 0 that
maxim is inapplicable to "involuntary" manslaughter, where death results
from the commission of an unlawful or culpably negligent act T or the
omission of a legal duty.1 s Thus, paralleling the instant conviction is a case
where the defendant counselled the sailing of a steamer with a defective
boiler and was convicted of manslaughter following a fatal explosion.1 0 Apart
from logical concepts, imposition of the penalty upon the truck owner is in
fact less severe than the similar treatment of the driver. For the driver prob-
ably lacked authority to have the brakes fixed, and, realistically viewed, his
choice was to pay the repair bill himself or to surrender his employment.
Perhaps he should be allowed to escape criminal liability by reporting defects
to his employer, but this would be contrary to the rule that obedience to a
master is no defense to prosecution for an unlawful act.20
It is necessary, however, to consider the limitations of the case as a means
of enforcing the equipment statutes. Here the jury found both defendants
culpably negligent under the circumstances. While the courts have sometimes
ruled that where the violation of any statute is the proximate cause of death,
the offender is guilty of manslaughter as a matter of law,2 in the motor
vehicle cases convictions are generally based upon a finding of culpable negli-
gence.22 Accordingly, jurors reluctant to impose heavy penalties may ab-
15. Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another (1930) 43 I-rLtv. L.
REV. 689, 703-4.
16. 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROVW. (1st Arn. ed. 1847) 436: Bibithe's Case, 4 Coke
43b (K. B. 1597); State v. Robinson, 12 Wash. 349, 41 Pac. 51 (1895). Section 2 of
the N. Y. PENAL LAw, a statutory provision common to many states, abalishing the
distinction between accessories before the fact and principals, does not solve the logical
difficulty that one not present cannot he guilty of an unpremeditated crime.
17. Regina v. Gaylor, 7 Cox. C. C. 253 (1857); MILT., CnnuI.-, Lw (1934)
§76; 1 BisnoP, NEW CRIMNAL LAw (9th ed. 1923) §673. See cases cited in notes
7, 8, 9 supra.
18. United States v. Van Schaick, 134 Fed. 592 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1904) ; cf. Rex
v. Russell [1933] Vict. L. R. 59, (1934) 47 H.mv. L. REv. 531.
19. State v. McVay, 47 R. I. 292, 132 At. 436 (1926), (1926) 40 Hinv. L REy. 321,
25 'MIcH. L. REv. 72.
20. Smith v. District of Columbia, 12 App. D. C. 33 (1897); CLtnn Anxo MrsHAL,
CRIMEs (3d ed. 1927) § 195; MILLER, CramNAL L~xw (1934) § 81.
21. Wilson v. State, 173 Miss. 372, 161 So. 744 (1935); State v. Rountree, 181 j. C.
535, 106 S. E. 669 (1921). For an extreme case disposing of the requirement of prod-
mate cause, see Keller v. State, 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S. W. 803 (19-7).
22. People v. Black, 111 Cal. App. 90, 295 Pac. 87 (1931); People v. Flanagan,
338 Ill. 353, 170 N. E. 265 (1930) ; State v. Stansell, 203 N. C. 69, 164 S. E. 5S0 (1932) ;
see also note 14, mpra. In New York the driver cannot be convicted of first-degree
manslaughter based on statutory violation, but is subject only to the penalty of second-
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solve owners as well as drivers by finding that the violation of the equipment
statute does not constitute "more than ordinary negligence.1 23 Another limit-
ing factor is that the owner and the driver admitted knowledge of the de-
fect. It is doubtful whether in the absence of such knowledge either could
be convicted, so that the usual difficulty of proving actual knowledge, par-
ticularly on the part of an absent owner, may well defeat many prosecutions.
Yet conscious wrongdoing is not essential to the violation of the type of
statute here involved,2 4 and, since the "should-have-known" concept is not
foreign to criminal law, 25 a jury might conceivably be permitted to find the
owner or the driver culpably negligent for failure to inspect equipment, and
consequently guilty of manslaughter for death resulting from a discover-
able defect. Beyond this, there is the remote possibility that the owner, as
employer, might be held to an absolute criminal liability for his employee's
violation of the equipment statute,26 and consequently guilty of the proxi-
mately resulting manslaughter.
Even more speculative is the vulnerability of a corporate owner to man-
slaughter conviction under circumstances similar to those of the principal
case, but the question is significant because of widespread corporate owner-
ship of commercial vehicles. Convictions of corporations for all but the most
personal crimes have been increasing,2 7 sometimes extending even to man-
slaughter, 28 but the decisions are not clear as to whether a corporation may be
degree manslaughter based on culpable negligence. People v. Grieco, 266 N. Y. 48,
193 N. E. 634 (1934), (1935) 35 Cot. L. REv. 446.
23. See Judge Colden's charge to the jury in the principal case (record not yet
printed). This is the common definition of criminal or culpable negligence. People
v. Angelo, 246 N. Y. 451, 457. 159 N. E. 394, 396 (1927) ; Commonwealth v. Gill, 120 Pa.
Super. 22, 34, 182 Atl. 103, 108 (1935), (1936) 10 TE-IP. L. Q. 327. Sometimes a defini-
tion approximating that of ordinary negligence is used. People v. Wilson, 193 Cal.
512, 518, 226 Pac. 5, 7 (1924) ; Romines v. State, 45 Okla. Cr. 40, 46, 281 Pac. 310, 312
(1929).
24. Intent is immaterial to the statutory misdemeanor of operating a car while
intoxicated. State v. Storrs, 105 Vt. 180, 163 Atl. 560 (1933); cf. Snyder v. State, 204
Ind. 666, 672, 185 N. E. 507, 509 (1933) (overloading).
25. United States v. Wilson, 59 F. (2d) 97 (W. D. Wash. 1932); State v. Work-
ers' Socialist Publishing Co., 150 Minn. 406, 185 N. W. 931 (1921).
26. Under similar regulatory statutes, such as pure food, liquor and child labor
laws, employers have irequently been fined even though their servants acted without
their knowledge or consent or against express orders. DeZarn v. Commonwealth,
195 Ky. 686, 243 S. W. 921 (1922) ; State v. Sobelman, 271 N. W. 484 (Minn. 1937) ;
Simpson v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 484, 173 Pac. 529 (1918) ; see Sayre, Sipra note 15,
at 713 et seq.
27. See Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 827.
28. State v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 90 N. J. L. 372, 103 Atl. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1917),
aff'd 94 N. J. L. 171, 111 Atl. 257 (1920), (1920) 5 MINN. L. REv. 74; cf. United States
v. Van Schaick, 134 Fed. 592 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1904). Contra: Commonwealth v.
Illinois Cent. R. R., 152 Ky. 320, 153 S. W. 459 (1913) ; Rex. v. Cory Bros. Ltd. [1927]
1 K. B. 810, (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 118. The New York statutory definition of homicide,
as the killing of one human being by another (PENAL LAW § 1042), has been strictly
construed to preclude convictions of corporations. People v. Rochester R'y. & Light
Co., 195 N. Y. 102, 88 N. E. 22 (1909). A corporation cannot be prosecuted for a
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charged with the knowledge and purpose of any of its agents,m which would
of course include vehicle drivers, or only for acts authorized by directors
or officers.30 Since the decisive element in conviction of the owner in the
principal case is control over the car and driver rather than mere ownership,
the individuals directly responsible for the violation and consequent death
should be held, regardless of whether the corporation is penalizedP t Accord-
ingly, on the basis either of actual knowledge or of negligent failure to dis-
cover defects, liability might be imposed on the intermediate agent respon-
sible for supervision and inspection of vehicles.3 2
The effectiveness of possible manslaughter convictions as a deterrent force
upon owners and drivers who are careless of their equipment may be ques-
tioned, in view of the fact that irresponsible persons are evidently willing
to take the chance that mechanical defects will not result in a killing. But
the same might be said of the accepted treatment of the drunken driver.
The action of both prosecutor and jury in the principal case apparently
reflects a shift of public sentiment towards recognition that a car without
brakes is as great a menace as one in the hands of an intoxicated driver.as
If the penalty seems severe, compulsory inspection provides a less drastic
and perhaps more effective method of securing compliance with the equip-
ment statutes.
34
crime when the punishment is only death or imprisonment. People v. Strong, 363 Ill.
602, 2 N. E. (2d) 942 (1936).
29. State v. Pennsylvania R. R., 84 N. J. L. 550, 87 Ad. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1913) (rail-
road indicted for smoke nuisance committed by employees) ; People v. Sheffield Farms-
Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N. Y. 25, 121 N. E. 474 (1918) (dairy fined where delivery
man hired child to help him); see N. Y. Central & Hudson River R. R. v. United
States, 212 U. S. 481, 494-5 (1909).
30. Corporations have been held immune from conviction when the acts were not
authorized by officers. People v. Canadian Fur Trappers Corp., 248 N. Y. 159, 161 N. E.
455 (1928) ; see American Socialist Soc. v. United States, 266 Fed. 212, 214 (C. C. A.
2d, 1920) ; Grant Bros. Const. Co. v. United States, 13 Ariz. 3,S, 395, 114 Pac. 955, 957
(1911). Often the question is ignored. State v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 90 N. J. L. 372,
103 Atl. 685 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Charlottesville, 126 Va.
800, 101 S. E. 357 (1919).
31. For the argument that fining the corporation penalizes only the stockholders
without providing an adequate deterrent to the active officers, see Canfield, Corporate
Responsibility for Crime (1914) 14 CoL- L. Rv. 469, 478. But see Edgerton, su1pra
note 27, at 832 et seq.
32. Officers of the corporate owner of the steamer "General Slocum" which
burned and sank at the cost of 900 lives, were convicted of manslaughter as having
aided and abetted the corporation in not providing adequate life preservers, where a
federal statute provided the penalty for the owner, but made no mention of corpora-
tions or corporate officers. United States v. Van Schaick, 134 Fed. 592 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1904).
33. Another recent instance of apparently unprecedented action on the part of a
prosecutor, again reflecting the public attitude, was the charging of a passenger as
accessory after the fact to a hit-and-run driver. People v. Inch and McCarron, Queens
Felony Ct. N. Y., N. Y. Times, March 26, 1937, p. 1, col. 2.
34. Action has been taken along this line in a number of states. In Connecticut
the commissioner of motor vehicles may establish and maintain a system of semi-annual
inspections; the registration of a motor vehicle owner who fails to comply vill be sus-
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THE "PROTECTED" LOAN AS A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE*
THE "PROTECTED" loan is a combination loan and insurance contract which
provides for insurance on the borrower's life during the term of the loan,
so that the obligation to repay will be cancelled in case of death., This
type of contract, in varied forms, has been in wide use during the past
twenty years in the industrial banking field.2 Recently, with the expansion
of industrial banking interests into real estate financing, the insurance feature
has been extended to mortgage loans. To both borrower and lender the
"protected" loan offers definite advantages. Since the risk of death during
the term of the loan is spared both parties, the borrower's property may
pass to his family unencumbered, and the lender is freed from the necessity
of proceeding against the decedent's estate, a very unsatisfactory method of
collection where the loan is small and the borrower impecunious.
Whatever its social desirability, some forms of the "protected" loan tread
dangerously near the edge of illegality. An agreement to lend money which
provides that the duty of repayment is to be cancelled in the event of the
obligor's death is a contract of insurance,3 at least where the transaction is
one of a number in a plan to spread the risk.4 Consequently, the borrower
may set up the loan company's failure to comply with the insurance laws
of the state as a valid defense to an action on the debt.5 On the other hand,
the lender may legally insist that as further security for the loan an existing
insurance policy on the borrower's life be assigned to it,6 or that a new
pended. CoNN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1935) § 617c, amending CoNN. GEx. STAT. (1930)
§ 1603. Cf. MASs. AN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 90, § 7A; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 75, § 431; ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1936) c. 951/2,
§ 26b. In New York inspection is required only for public service vehicles. N. Y. Pun.
SERV. LAW, § 61.14.
* Philbrick v. Puritan Corp., 178 Okla. 489, 63 P. (2d) 38 (1936).
1. For a description of how the "protected" loan operates, see HEUZOG, TuE 'MonRs
PLAN OF INDUSTRIAL BANKING (1928) 39-44.
2. "Industrial banking" is the business of making small personal loans to salary-
earners for consumption purposes. The Morris Plan banks and similar chains confine
themselves to this type of loan almost exclusively. Recently, the commercial banks
have entered the field, and in 1930, 147 commercial banks maintained small loan de-
partments. See CLARx, FINANCING THE CONSUMR (1931) ; RonmxsoN & NUGENT, REa-
ULATION OF THE SM1ALL LOAN BusixEss (1935).
3. Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 77 Fed. 32 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896), aff'd
on other grounds, 172 U. S. 351 (1899) ; Attorney General v. C. E. Osgood Co., 249
Mass. 473, 144 N. E. 371 (1924) ; State v. Beardsley, 88 Minn. 20, 92 N. W. 472 (1902) ;
Barna v. Clifford Country Estates, Inc., 143 N. Y. Misc. 813, 258 N. Y. Supp. 671 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1932) ; United Sec. Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Ritchey, 187 Pa. 173, 40 Atl. 978
(1898); see (1924) 23 Micn. L. REV. 191.
4. See VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 2, 57.
5. See cases cited supra note 3.
6. But if the interest charged on the loan is usurious, the assignment of the policy
will be void. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Benedict, 88 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937).
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policy be taken out naming the lender as beneficiaryJ The duty to repay
will then be terminated when the lender receives the proceeds of the policy.
Although illegality may be avoided by introducing a licensed insurance com-
pany to write the policy, a certain measure of security is lost, for there is
generally no assurance that the borrower will maintain the policy in force
by punctual payment of premiums. To eliminate this uncertainty, borrowers
have been required to pay the insurance premiums directly to the lender, who
transmits them to the insurer, and the maturity of the loan is accelerated upon
failure to pay premiums on the policy. When the legality of such a trans-
action is attacked the courts must decide whether the lender, by collecting
the premiums, has made its own illegal contract of insurance, or whether
it has merely required an insurance policy as security for the loan.
A recent case indicates the difficulties encountered in such a decision. Upon
applying for a loan from the plaintiff mortgage company, affiliated with the
Morris Plan system, the defendant was required to sign three instruments:
a note, a mortgage upon the defendant's home give as security for the note,
and an application for an insurance policy on the defendant's life. The policy,
naming the plaintiff as beneficiary, was secured from the Morris Plan Insur-
ance Society, another Morris Plan subsidiary, licensed to do business in
Oklahoma," but the premiums were made part of the principal sum of the
note and paid directly to the plaintiff, which transmitted the portion of each
installment representing the premium to the Insurance Society.0 The de-
fendant failed to pay eight consecutive monthly installments on the note,
and suit was brought to foreclose the mortgage. Rejecting the defense that
the mortgage included a contract of insurance between the plaintiff and the
defendant, which was illegal because of the plaintiff's non-compliance .ith
the insurance laws, the court held, one judge dissenting,10 that the defendant
had merely been required to hypothecate an insurance policy issued by an
independent company."
7. A creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor which will support
an assignment of an existing policy or a new policy naming the creditor as beneficiary.
See Canmack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643 (U. S. 1872); Morrow v. National Life Ass'n,
184 Mo. App. 308, 168 S. NV. 881 (1914); see VA.cE, I.nsunA;cs (2d ed. 1930) 165;
Glenn, Creditor Insurancc and Creditors' Rights (1921) 21 COL L rEv. 269, 220.
8. The plaintiff dealt exclusively with the Morris Plan Bank of Tulsa, as agent
for both the plaintiff and the Insurance Society. But a statute [OH.A. ST,%'. (Harlow
1931) § 10515] prohibits any corporation from acting as the agent of an insurance com-
pany. Although the record does not indicate, it is probable that one of the officers of
the Morris Plan Bank of Tulsa, and not the bank itself, was the agent of the Insur-
ance Society. The statute has never been construed by the Oklahoma courts. For the
effect of a similar law, see Cordy v. Hale, 177 Wis. 68, 187 N. AV. 663 (1922).
9. The plaintiff paid the life insurance premium amounting to 13-% of tie sum
originally loaned in advance for the year to come to the Insurance Society, and then
collected it from the defendant as a part of his installment each month. The face value
of the policy decreased annually so as to equal the sum due on the note. Philbricl: v.
Puritan Corp., 178 Okla. 4S9, 63 P. (2d) 38 (1936), record p. 65, 79.
10. One judge dissented, but when a motion for reargument was denied, a second
judge, absent at the first trial, also dissented.
11. Philbrick v. Puritan Corp., 178 Okla. 489, 63 P. (2d) 38 (1936).
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It might be argued, as was done in the dissenting opinion, that the plaintiff
mortgage company made its own contract of insurance with the defendant
entirely apart from the policy with the licensed insurer. This contention
finds support both in the facts that the premiums were paid directly to the
lender, and that the plaintiff advertised that a mortgage loan need not be
repaid in case of death but made no mention of the necessity of an insurance
policy. The plaintiff might then be said to have become bound by its offer,
even if no insurance policy were ever issued, when the defendant, induced
by the advertisement, made formal application for the loan and the plaintiff
accepted this application. In that event the insurance policy later obtained
would be considered merely a form of reinsurance.12  However, since evi-
dence of preliminary negotiation at variance with the terms of an integrated
written instrument is inadmissible to contradict the written instrument if
the latter is complete on its face, 13 this analysis would be inapplicable to the
instant case, because the final mortgage provided that the condition precedent
to the cancellation of the note was not the death of the defendant,14 but
payment of the debt either by the defendant or by receipt of the proceeds
of the insurance policy.15 Since the plaintiff did not promise to do anything
in the event of the defendant's death, the payment of premiums directly to
the plaintiff is not alone so significant as to make the agreement one to insure.
The majority's conclusion may also be questioned, since it was based in
large part upon the assumption that the insurance policy was carried by a
"wholly independent insurance company"'I when as a matter of fact the
plaintiff and the insurance company were part of the same financial organ-
ization. Despite the preservation of two corporate entities, the same Morris
Plan interests executed the mortgage and insured the defendant's life. If
the corporate forms were to be disregarded because they were part of a
scheme to circumvent a legal prohibitiony t the mortgage and the insurance
12. This is the conclusion that was reached by way of dictum in the similar case of
Missouri K. & T. Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 77 Fed. 32 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896).
13. Seitz v. Brewers Refrig. Mach. Co., 141 U. S. 510 (1891); Kilroy v. Schimmel,
243 Mass. 262, 137 N. E. 366 (1922) ; Ruppert v. Singhi, 243 N. Y. 156, 153 N. E. 33
(1926); see 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 633.
14. By the terms of the agreement the note would not have been cancelled had the
defendant died while the insurance company had a valid defense to a claim upon the
policy.
15. For a series of cases in which the condition precedent to cancellation of a
mortgage was the death of the borrower, see Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. Krumseig,
77 Fed. 32 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896); Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. McLachlan, 59 Minn.
468, 61 N. W. 560 (1894); Mathews v. Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co., 69 Minn. 318,
72 N. W. 121 (1897).
16. Nowhere in the record was the court advised of the intercorporate relationship
of the plaintiff and the Insurance Society. The Industrial Finance Corp., the top hold-
ing company of the Morris Plan interests, controls, inter alia, two subholding companies,
one of which owns the plaintiff Puritan Corp., and the other the Morris Plan Insur-
ance Society. MOODY'S BANKS, INSURANcE, REAL ESTATE, INVESTMIENT TRUSTS (1936)
966-9; PooR's FISCAL VOLUME (1936) 2563-6.
17. Cf. Chicago, M. & St.. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n, 247 U. S. 490 (1918);
United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 254 U. S. 255 (1920). But cf. United States v.
Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 298 U. S. 492 (1936), (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 299.
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policy might be declared part of the same agreement. Such a combination,
however, would closely approximate "advance insurance,"' 8 which has been
declared lawful whenever the mortgagee-insurer has complied with the reg-
ulations placed upon insurance companies by state law. These regulations
are imposed in order to supervise the investments of insurance companies
for the protection of those members of the public who are beneficiaries.
Although this consideration might have induced the court to say that the
statute was inapplicable to a situation where the beneficiary is the mortgagee-
insurer itself,'9 there was no necessity for such a decision in the instant
case for the Morris Plan Insurance Society is licensed to do business in
Oklahoma. On the other hand, if it should seem desirable to supervise the
investments of a mortgagee-insurer, it might be thought inadvisable to permit
the union of these two businesses, for insurance assets would be concentrated
in non-liquid real estate mortgages. But even this objection was satisfied
in the instant case, since the insurance risk was borne by a separately incor-
porated insurance company which segregated its assets from those of the
lender and invested them in the manner prescribed by law. Yet there is one
further difficulty which a mortgagee-insurer must face. Under some deci-
sions, the premiums payable on a combined mortgage and insurance contract
will be computed as additional interest on the loan, and if the total exceeds
the legal rate of interest, the transaction will be declared usurious.20 This
requirement may have the effect of placing part of the cost of the insurance
on the lender -a result which does not seem unreasonable in view of the
fact that the insurance benefits him as well as the borrower. But in the
instant case it would seem that even this prerequisite to a valid contract had
been satisfied, for the total charge to the borrower was slightly under the
maximum rate.2 '
18. This is an insurance contract distinguished by the fact that the benefits are
paid in advance. The insurance company pays the insured the amount of his policy
on the day it is issued, and the insured promises to pay annual premiums until his
death. A mortgage on the insured's property is taken as security for the payment of
premiums. These contracts were upheld in United Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Ritchey, 187 Pa.
173, 40 Atl. 978 (1898); United Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Brovn, 270 Pa. 264, 113 AUt. 443
(1921); United Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Perugini U. M. R. Ass'n, 273 Pa. 554, 117 AtI.
413 (1922); see United Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Bond, 16 App. D. C. 579 (1900).
19. See Comment (1936) 36 COL L REv. 456, 464.
20. Missouri Valley Life Ins. Co. v. Kittle, 2 Fed. 113 (C. C. Neb. 1890) ; National
Life Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 7 Fed. 805 (C. C. Iowa 1831) ; Brower v. Life Ins. Co. of Va.,
86 Fed. 748 (C. C. NV. D. N. C., 1893); Miller v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 118 N. C. 612,
24 S. E. 484 (1896) ; Carter v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 122 N. C. 338, 30 S. E. 341 (1893).
21. In Oklahoma, the maximum rate is 10%. O.A. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 9518.
The borrower received $4000, which he was to pay back in monthly installments of
$44 over a fifteen year period. The monthly installment included the interest on the
loan (8% of the unpaid principal) and the premium on the insurance policy (e60 per
year, or 129% of the original principal). The total of the two would seem to be just
under 10%, the maximum rate.
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REGULATION OF PICK-UP AND DELIVERY SERVICE BY THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION*
IN ORDER to check loss of 1. c. 1. (less-than-carload) freight to competitive
intercity highway truckers,' railroads have established truck pick-up and
delivery service in connection with rail line-haul.2 The railroads' use of
their own motor trucks between station and shipper's door meets the ship-
per's demand for complete service, reduces the overall time of transporta-
tion,3 and achieves numerous economies resulting primarily from speedier
movement of freight through the terminals. 4 Because these advantages of
an integrated rail and truck service were offset, in part at least, by unregu-
lated motor carrier competition particularly in short-haul, 1. c. 1. freight,5
railroads pressed for legislation to regulate this growing competitive branch
of the transportation system. 6 Their efforts culminated in the passage of
the Motor Carrier Act.7
Recently, the railroads discovered that the Act might be invoked by the
trucking companies themselves to protect their own position. Various truck-
ing associations appeared before the Interstate Commerce Commission 8 to
*American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 655 (D. D. C.
1936).
1. L. c. 1. traffic has suffered a greater loss than any other class - one not
explained by the business depression alone. Coordination of Motor Transportation,
182 I. C. C. 263, 283 (1932); MERCHANDISE TRAFFIc REPORT (Federal Coordinator of
Transportation, Section of Transportation Service, 1934) 4. This loss is generally
attributed to highway truck competition, which serves substantially the same territory
as rails. Motor Bus and Truck Operation, 140 I. C. C. 685, 723 (1928) ; Coordination
of Motor Transportation, supra, at 374.
2. Pick-up and Delivery in Official Territory, 218 I. C. C. 441, 447 (1936).
In 1932 a number of eastern railroads provided free pick-up and delivery service for
I. c. 1. freight moving 260 miles or less, with "plus charges" for longer distances. To
a limited extent, pick-up and delivery have been performed by railroads in this country
since 1859. Id. at 443-445.
3. Id. at 457; Motor Bus & Motor Truck Operation, 140 I. C. C. 685, 715 (1928);
Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 339 (1932). The shipper's
desire for a door-to-door service was largely responsible for the growth of highway
transportation. MERCHANDISE TRAFFIC REPORT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 5 and n. 31.
4. Terminal costs constitute a very large proportion of a railroad's operating
expenses and are particularly heavy on 1. c. I. freight. Motor Bus & Truck Operation,
140 I. C. C. 685, 715 (1928); MOULTON, THE A.tMERICAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM
(1933) xlv, 671; MERCHANDISE TRAFFIC REPORT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 9, n. 105. The
use of truck pick-up and delivery, by relieving congestion in terminal districts, allows
a reduction in number and capacity of freight stations. It also obviates the need for
many switching movements, reduces the cost of station handling of 1. c. I. freight, and
permits heavier loading of cars. Pick-up and Delivery in Official Territory, 218 I. C. C.
441, 450; MERCHANDISE TRAFFic REPORT, op. cit. supra, at 5.
5. Id. at 326, 362-4 (comments of railroad executives).
6. Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 382 (1932); see
MCCOLLESTER AND CLARK, FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION (1935) 81, 83-84.
7. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §301 (Supp. 1936).
8. Pick-up and Delivery in Official Territory, 218 I. C. C. 441 (1936).
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protest the unlawfulness of new tariff schedules by which eastern railroads
proposed to establish substantially universal "free" pick-up and delivery
service, with a uniform allowance to shippers performing their own ser-
vice.9 They argued that the railroads performing store-door cnllection and
delivery were common carriers by motor vehicle within the meaning of the
Motor Carrier Act,10 and therefore subject to its requirement of obtaining
certificates of public convenience and necessity." Further, they alleged that
since the existing 1. c. 1. rates for station-to-station transportation were not
sufficiently remunerative to cover the additional expense of the pick-up
and delivery service, these rates constituted an unfair competitive practice
in violation of Section 202 of the Act;'- to remedy this, the petitioning
truckers insisted that compensatory collection and delivery charges should
be quoted separately from station-to-station rates. 13 But while the Commis-
sion raised the minimum rate in conjunction with which free pick-up service
might be rendered, 14 it otherwise approved the disputed tariffs. The com-
plainants then sought injunctive relief in a federal district court. 10 Without
passing upon the question of the petitioner's standing in court to attack
the Commission's orders, the three-judge statutory court refused to review
the rates authorized by the Commission on the ground that they were not
clearly unreasonable, and interpreted the Motor Carrier Act as not re-
quiring railroads to secure certificates of public convenience and necessity
before engaging in pick-up and delivery service. 10
9. The new tariffs removed all "plus charges" and provided for a refund of
five cents per 100 pounds to any consignor or consignee performing his own service.
10. "The term 'common carrier by motor vehicle' means any person who or which
undertakes . . . to transport passengers or property . . . for the general public in
interstate or foreign commerce by motor vehicle for compensation . . . including
such motor vehicle operations of carriers by rail or water, and of express or forwarding
companies, except to the extent that these operations are subject to the provisions
of part I." §203(a) (14), 49 STAT. 544 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §303(a)(14) (Supp. 1935).
11. §206(a), 49 STAT. 551 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §305(a) (Supp. 1936).
12. Pick-up and Delivery in Official Territory, 218 I. C. C. 441, 475 (1936). Com-
pare Brief for American Trucking Ass'ns, pp. 43 et seq. (argument of protestants
based on cost study) with Brief for Eastern Railroads, pp. 43 el seq. (rates justified
on "added traffic theory").
13. Transport Topics, Aug. 31, 1936, p. 4, col. 2. Local truckmen, particularly,
objected to the free service proposed. Id., April 6, 1936, p. 5, col. 1; May 18, 1936,
p. 1, col. 2.
14. The Commission, finding that traffic was being handled at an out-of-pocket
loss, increased the minimum rate from 30 cents per 100 pounds to 45 cents. Picl:-up
and Delivery in Official Territory, 213 I. C. C. 441, 4S0 (1936).
15. American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 655 (D. D. C
1936). A similar application for an interlocutory injunction vas denied in Merchant
Truckmens Bureau of New York v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y.
1936), and the petition for a permanent injunction in this case is pending.
16. American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 655 (D. D. C.
1936).
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Apart from the question of statutory interpretation,17 there would seem
to be little practical reason for compelling railroads to obtain certificates.
Since the Commission exercises no control over the numerous independent
motor carriers engaged in purely intrastate activity,' and since the cer-
tificate requirement is expressly inapplicable to contract and private motor
carriers,' 9 imposition of the restriction would not prevent unnecessary dupli-
cation of facilities in terminal districts. Moreover, the relatively high degree
of financial responsibility of the railroads obviates the need for employing
the certificate device as a method of excluding irresponsible units. 20
A more useful weapon in securing the ends of the Interstate Commerce
Act is the Commission's power to control rates. As already indicated, the
Commission may set the minimum line-haul rate with free pick-up and
delivery service 2 1 so as to eliminate an unremunerative combined rail-motor
service for shorter distances more cheaply and efficiently handled by trucks
alone. 22 Further use of its rate power would remove the discriminatory
17. The language of the Act is ambiguous. See note 10, supra. The court reasoned
that since the Commission under Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act had taken
jurisdiction over the terminal motor operations of railroads long before the passage
of the Motor Carrier Act (Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act), it must have
been the intention of Congress in adding the proviso, "except to the extent that these
operations are subject to the provisions of part I," to exclude rail pick-up and delivery
service from the requirements of Part II and to include only the previously unregu-
lated intercity motor vehicle operations of railroads. But the wording permits of a
contrary construction that, insofar as railroad terminal motor service is not completely
within the regulatory scope of the Commission under Part I, it is included in the
provisions of Part If. See Pick-Up & Delivery in Official Territory, 218 I. C. C. 441,
499-500 (1936) (Commissioner Lee dissenting).
18. "See MCCOLLESTER AND CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, c. 15.
19. Contract carriers must obtain permits as a prerequisite to engaging in inter-
state transportation. These will be granted if the operations are "consistent with the
public interest and the policy declared in Section 202 (a)." § 209, 49 STAT. 552 (1935),
49 U. S. C. § 309 (Supp. 1936). For a discussion of the distinction between the
requirement of a permit and of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, see
McCOLLESTER AND CLARK, op. cit. supra note 6, c. 26.
20. Shippers can rely on the financial capacity of railroads to reimburse them for
goods damaged, lost or stolen in pick-up and delivery service; receiverships and
reorganizations have not destroyed the railroads' ability to furnish dependable service.
21. See note 14, supra.
22. Truck service is undoubtedly superior for distances under 75 miles and gener-
ally up to 150 miles. Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I. C. C. 263, 376 (1932) ;
MERCHANDISE TRAgric REPORT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 5, 17. Trucks do not have
the burdensome packing requirements of railroads. And their speed and flexibility
of schedule, as well as willingness to call for shipments after railroad freight stations
have closed, enable them to make early morning deliveries and handle emergency ship-
ments. Coordination of Motor Transportation, supra, at 301; TALBOT, THE SHIPPING
SITUATION BETWEEN NEW YORK CITY AND PHILADELPHIA (1931) 20, 25-26; MR-
CHANDISE TRAFFIC REPORT, op. cit. supra, at 6, n. 43. For a suggestion that coordination
cannot be effected through adjustment of rates with the aim of directing. movement
of traffic to the proper agencies, but only through the formation of unified transporta-
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aspects of the present tariff; for the granting of free pick-up and delivery
service in conjunction with unaltered rail-haul rates constitutes a rate re-
duction which, by disregarding the cost differential of the trucking service
at different points23 and by failing to provide for compensating rate revision
at those places without the service,2 4 not only discriminates against shippers
and receivers in various localities, but also means probable performance of
the function below cost at some points with resulting harm to competing
local independent truckers. If the Commission were to require a separate
statement of line-haul and terminal charges, these elements of discrimina-
tion could be eliminated, and at the same time the Commission would find
it easier to determine whether either part of the transportation service is
being conducted below cost.2 5
As a matter of sound business policy, the railroads would probably find
it profitable to impose self-limitations upon entrance into pick-up and
delivery service; for the idea of integrating this function with rail haul
under the management of railroads has an emotional appeal that might
easily impel uneconomic action. In certain situations, the railroad com-
panies' employment of only a few subsidiary and affiliated motor companies
under contract2 6 may be ill-advised. Independent local truckmen are fa-
miliar with local conditions and individual delivery requirements. Many
have trade connections useful in solicitation of freight. And in the smaller
towns, where the tonnage is not large enough to warrant a railroad's main-
taining a truck and operator, local truckmen can rely upon the support of
other business besides the service performed for the rail carrier. In these
circumstances, to take the business of collection and delivery from the inde-
pendent draymen is to threaten the loss of a useful ally.
tion companies, see Moulton, Our Transport Plant is Ovorbuilt (1936) 101 Ryr. Ac
719.
23. In New York City the railroads pay 16.5 cents per 10D lbs. for pick-up or
delivery; in Pittsburgh, 10 cents; Philadelphia, 10 and 11 cents; Boston, 9 cents;
Buffalo, 8 cents; a number of other cities, 6 cents; and in the majority of towns,
5 cents. Pick-up and Delivery in Official Territory, 218 I. C. C. 441, 450 (1936).
Thus, in effect, the line-haul rate is reduced disproportionately. See id. at 435, 487.
24. Though termed "universal," the service is not rendered at all points. Compare
CuiuEr, PxcK-Up AND DELvy SEWicE TARF, I. C. C. No. A-524, with SuEF'mm,
LIST OF FREIGHT STATIONS, I. C. C. No. F-3062.
25. See Pick-up and Delivery in Official Territory, 218 L C. C. 441, 46 (1936);
Constructive and Off-Track Freight Stations, 156 I. C. C. 205, 232 (1929).
26. The Pennsylvania Railroad had contracts with only 849 trucking concerns for
the service at 1,282 stations, including but 3 concerns at New York City. In contrast,
the policy of western carriers at St. Louis and Chicago has been to make contracts
with any truck operator conforming to certain qualifications. Pick-up and Delivery in
Official Territory, 218 I. C. C. 441, 449 (1936).
27. See SErN. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 266.
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SUIT ]BY STOCKHOLDER WHEN DIRECTORS REFUSE TO BARGAIN
COLLECTIVELY WITH EMPLOYEES *
RECURRING controversies between labor and capital have centered around
the basic issue of union recognition, for many employers actively combat
unionization initially, or else refuse to negotiate with the representatives of
already organized employees.' From time to time legislatures have devised
various expedients to curb the activities of anti-union employers,2 and in
the recently validated National Labor Relations Act collective bargaining
was finally made mandatory in industries affecting interstate commerce. 3
While the enactment of similar state statutes 4 would place a like compul-
sion upon industries whose activities are under the current definition, not
considered to be in interstate commerce, a recent case suggests a device to
enforce collective bargaining both where no such statute exists and where
there is such a statute but it cannot be enforced by the usual sanctions because
the corporate owner has closed its doors.5 A minority stockholder, obviously
a union sympathizer, brought suit for the appointment of a temporary re-
ceiver, the recovery of damages, and a decree compelling the corporation
to bargain collectively, alleging that the corporation had been placed in
imminent danger of insolvency as a result of a prolonged strike and boycott
precipitated by the refusal of the directors to deal with employees. The
Circuit Court for Milwaukee County in Wisconsin denied a motion to strike
these allegations,6 resting its decision principally on the public policy of the
state in favor of collective bargaining as expressed in a state statute7 simi-
lar to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.8
A minority stockholder may resort to the courts to protect the corporation
against the directors' fraud, gross mismanagement, or illegal or ultra vires
acts.0 While a refusal to bargain does not constitute fraudulent or ultra vires
* Pieplow v. A. J. Lindemann & Hoverson Co., Circuit Court Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin, December 24, 1936.
1. See Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of
Collectie Bargaining (1937) 50 HARV. L. REv. 1071.
2. Ibid.
3. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151, 157 (Supp. 1936). National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937).
4. Such statutes have already been adopted by Wisconsin and Utah. N. Y. Times,
April 15, 1937, p. 2, col. 7; (1937) 144 THE NATION 170. A similar New York statute
has passed both houses of the legislature and is now awaiting ratification by the gov-
ernor. N. Y. Times, May 15, 1937, p. 6, col. 2.
5. See N. Y. Times, May 25, 1937, p. 17, col. 1. This device could be similarly used
to supplement the National Labor Relations Act, and would be applicable to the other
unfair labor practices, besides refusal to bargain, mentioned in these statutes.
6. Pieplow v. A. J. Lindemann & Hoverson Co., Circuit Court Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin, December 24, 1936.
7. AVis. STAT. (1935) § 103.51.
8. 47 STAT. 70 (1932) 29 U. S. C. §§ 101, 102 (1934).
9. Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U. S. 450 (1881) ; Bush v. Bonner, 156 Ga. 143,
118 S. E. 658 (1923); Anglo-American Royalties Corp. v. Brentnall, 167 Okla. 305,
29 P. (2d) 120 (1934); 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1932)
§§ 5823-28, 5829 n. 44; 16 id. 7714. Before bringing suit the complainant must make
reasonable efforts to procure the present directors to redress his grievances. Central
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conduct, it may amount to gross mismanagement or illegality. A suit based
on gross mismanagement lies, conventionally, when the directors have
breached their trust,'0 but not when they have honestly exercised their dis-
cretionary powers."' If the circumstances that give rise to and the results
that flow from the same act vary sufficiently, it may be placed in either of
these flexible categories on different occasions.' 2 Inferences of gross mis-
management are thus sometimes drawn when a course of conduct pursued
by directors jeopardizes the financial position of a corporation. 13 And
while the determination of a labor policy would seem to be a typical discre-
tionary act,' 4 occasionally a decision may be so ill-advised as to amount to
actionable mismanagement. When, as in the instant case, the obduracy of
directors in refusing to deal at all with employees occasions a costly and pro-
longed labor dispute, sufficiently grave to threaten the financial stability of
the corporation, there are convincing grounds for asserting that the directors
have abused their discretion.
In those states with public policy statutes similar to that of Wisconsina
a cause of action may perhaps be stated, in the absence of gross mismanage-
Holding Co. v. Bushman, 238 Mich. 261, 213 N. WV. 120 (1927). For a general dis-
cussion of minority stockholder suits, see Rohrlich, Suits in Equity by Minority Stoch-
holders as a Mcans of Corporate Control (1933) 81 U. oF Pa. L REv. 692; Glenn,
The Stockholder's Suit-Corporatc and hidh,idual Grievances (1924) 33 YAt.L L. J.
580; Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 649, 665.
10. The relationship of the directors to the stockholders is said to be that of trustee
and cestui que trust. BALLAN-TriNE, MIANUAL OF CORPORATION_ Lw AND PRAnCE (1930)
596.
11. The typical statement is that the directors are elected for the very purplise of
determining the corporate management policy, and that an error in business judgment,
made honestly and in good faith, does not in itself give a minority stockholder a cause
of action. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Hewitt, 94 N. J. Eq. 65, 118 At. 267 (Ch.
1922). The judgment of the directors on questions of management enjoys the presump-
tion that it was formed in good faith. See Davis v. Louisville Gas and Electric Co.,
16 Del. Ch. 157, 169, 142 At. 654, 659 (Ch. 1928).
12. Compare Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 663 (1919)
(extra dividend declared by court), with City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hewitt
Realty Co., 257 N. Y. 62, 177 N.E. 309 (1931) (declaration of dividend refused). See
2 Cootx, CoRPORATiONS (Sth ed. 1923) § 545.
13. Gibbons Mfg. Co. v. Milan, 17 S. W. (2d) 844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); cf.
Prairie Lee Production Co. v. Tiller, 286 S. W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). Insolvency
or imminent danger of insolvency does not "per se" give rise to a cause of action. At-
lantic Trust Co. v. Consolidated Elec. Storage Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 402, 23 At. 934 (Ch.
1892). See Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank of Wichita Falls, 36 S. NV. (2d)
1057, 1059 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). A cause of action may of course be stated when
the corporation is solvent. Adams v. Farmers National Bank, 167 Ky. 506, 180 S. IV.
807 (1915).
14. See note 9, supra. But cf. Gibbons v. Milan Mfg. Co., 17 S. IV. (2d) 844 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929).
15. Public policy statements are included in 11 of the 13 state statutes similar to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and in one less comprehensive statute. See (1937) 46 YMaI
L. J. 1064. The states which have adopted anti-injunction statutes of this type will
in all likelihood be the first to adopt acts similar to the National Labor Relations Act.
See note 4, supra.
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ment, by resort to the concept of illegality. While the basis of stockholders'
suits for .the violation of mandatory statutes has never been clearly indi-
cated, perhaps because of the paucity of cases, courts have been moved for
the most part either by considerations of public policy or by a desire to pro-
tect the corporation from loss or injury. If the former theory is adopted,
redress would clearly be given under the public policy statutes.Y, For even
though the corporation was uninjured, a stockholder's suit has been sanc-
tioned not only when the management has violated a positive statute but
also when, in the absence of statutory breach, the directors have acted in
contravention of public policy. 17 Under the view that an action lies for
illegality only when it is accompanied by injury to the corporation,"8 there
is more difficulty in establishing a cause of action. If the injury contem-
plated by the courts is that which would result from the imposition of pen-
alties for statutory violation,'0 manifestly a breach of a public policy statute
is not actionable. But if, as some courts have indicated, an illegal act is
redressable when accompanied by any harm whatsoever to the corporation,20
a stockholder's suit for a refusal to bargain collectively will almost invariably
lie under a public policy statute, since such a course of management gen-
erally occasions costly labor strife.
The stockholder's suit gives labor another weapon, of doubtful potency,
with which to induce intrastate industries to bargain collectively. Since there
will generally be few stockholders in the comparatively small corporations
16. The minority stockholder would then be the enforcing agent of the state's pub-
lic policy as codified in specific statutory enactment. Cf. Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc.
343, 118 N. Y. Supp. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Thoroughgoold v. Georgetown Water Co.,
9 Del. Ch. 330, 82 Atl. 689 (Ch. 1912) ; see Carver v. Southern Iron and Steel Co.,
78 N. J. Eq. 81, 94, 78 At!. 240, 246 (Ch. 1910); Hatch v. Lucky Bill Mining Co., 25
Utah 405, 411, 71 Pac. 865, 866 (1903). But cf. Coquard v. National Linseed Oil Co.,
171 Ill. 480, 49 N. E. 563 (1898); Skeen v. Warren Irrigation Co., 42 Utah 602, 132
Pac. 1162 (1913). The Wisconsin court has interpreted this statute uniquely to give it
the effect of substantive law, thereby enabling a labor union, in a suit in its own name,
to enjoin the employer from interfering with the right of the employees to associate
freely, organize, and designate representatives for collective bargaining. Trustees of
Wis. State Fed. of Labor v. Simplex Sewing Machine Co., 215 Wis. 623, 256 N. W.
56 (1934), (1934) 10 Wis. L. REv. 116, (1934) 19 MARQ. L. REV. 49. Under such an
interpretation a minority stockholder's suit would not be necessary to enforce col-
lective bargaining, and it is difficult to see why a direct action was not brought by the
labor union in the instant case.
17. Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, 118 N. Y. Supp. 351 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Cen-
tral R. R. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582 (1869) ; cf. Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill.
551, 55 N. E. 577 (1899). But cf. Venner v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R., 177 App. Div.
296, 164 N. Y. Supp. 626 (2d Dep't 1917). See note 16, supra.
18. Compare Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 55 N. E. 577 (1899)
(injury proven and relief granted), with Venner v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R., 177 App.
Div. 296, 164 N. Y. Supp. 626 (2d Dep't 1917) (no injury to assets and no relie!
on similar facts) ; Cope v. District Fair Ass'n of Flora, Ill., 99 Ill. 489 (1881) ; 13
FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 5948.
19. See Rogers v. Lafayette Agr. Works, 52 Ind. 296, 304 (1875); 10 FLETcHER,
op. cit. supra note 9, § 4860, p. 283, n. 8.
20. See Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551, 626, 55 N. E. 577, 602
(1899).
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engaged in intrastate commerce, a union may have some difficulty in institut-
ing an action by purchasing stock in the name of the union or of an officer,2 1
or. by persuading a sympathetic stockholder to maintain suit.- And in any
event the practical value of this device may otherwise be limited, for while
compulsion, in the form of a mandatory injunction,2 can be exercised on a
corporation which has refused to negotiate with employees if the court con-
cedes the existence of a cause of action, the stockholder's suit will probably
have no great prophylactic effect. Should states with public policy statutes
once allow a stockholder's action based on illegality, employers, it is true,
may hesitate thereafter to refuse to bargain collectively. In other states, how-
ever, the mere threat that suit may be brought is not likely to induce cor-
porate directors to deal with employees, since the recognition of a cause of
action for gross mismanagement on one occasion would not furnish a neces-
sarily persuasive precedent for a refusal to bargain under different circum-
stances.2 4 Directors are more likely to be impelled to deal with employees
once an action is actually instituted, especially if the early stages of attack
are survived. After the motion to strike in the instant case was overruled,
for example, the directors conferred with representatives of the employees
and the controversy was settled.2 5 In the final analysis the effectiveness of
the stockholder's suit both as compellent and deterrent will, of course, de-
pend largely on whether or not courts are moved to manipulate the available
legal doctrine in accordance with the oft-expressed principle that the public
interest and policy 26 are persuasive factors in inducing equity to grant
relief.
27
21. As a holder of stock the union is entitled to the protection of the courts with-
out regard to its motive, or the amount of its holdings. See Wagner Electric Corp.
v. Hydraulic Brake Co., 269 Mich. 560, 565, 257 N. W. 894, K36 (1934) ; Gordon v.
Brucker, 208 Il. App. 181 (1917) ; 13 FLETCnER, op. cit. s.rpra note 9, § 5878. Nor is it
necessary under the majority rule that the alleged wrongs be committed after acqui-
sition of stock by a complainant. 13 FLExcHEn, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 5943, 5930, 5931
and cases there cited.
22. This device was apparently used in the instant case. Objections are sometimes
raised on the ground that the complainant is not the real party in interest; but even
the nominal party in interest has been allowed to maintain suit where public policy
demands. See Carver v. Southern Iron and Steel Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 81, 94, 78 Atd. 240,
246 (1910).
23. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Afich. 459, 170 N. ANT. 663 (1919) (extra
dividend declared by court). See Stott Realty Co. v. Orloff. 262 Mich. 375, 331, 247
N. W. 698, 699 (1933). Damages may prove an inadequate remedy since obdurate
directors may be willing to suffer liability to damages rather than submit to collective
bargaining, especially since damages will often be insubstantial. Cf. Mississippi Thea-
ters Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local Union No. 615, 174 Miss. 439, 164 So. 837 (1936);
Comment (1936) 36 Cot. L. RaY. 776, at 783.
24. See p. 1425, supra. It is of course doubtful that an action based on gross mis-
management would be recognized under any circumstances.
25. Communication to the YALE LAw JouRa.AL from Max J. Raskin, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, counsel for the complainant in the principal case, April 26, 1937.
26. For a general survey of the progress made by labor in the courts and legis.
latures, see Magruder, loc. cit. supra note 1, Sayre, Labor and th Courts (1930) 39
YALE L. J. 682. The danger that this device may be used in "strike" suits is not a
persuasive objection.
27. See Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 57 Sup. Ct. 592, 691 (1937).
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